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Foreword
Rapid technological progress and innovation can destroy jobs. This 
is not a new concern. Throughout history, with a great speeding-up 
during the Industrial Revolution, automation of production processes 
has led to efficiency gains and to the displacement of labour. But 
history has also shown that, in the longer run, gains in efficiency pay 
off and new jobs are created. Overall the balance has been broadly 
positive. Currently, in the post-crisis European Union, employment 
rates are high, signalling good news for the bloc’s welfare states, which 
largely rely on taxes and levies on employment for their funding.
But the past is not necessarily a guide to the future. The unprec-
edented digitalisation of our economies continues. Artificial intel-
ligence has become a reality and machines are able learn how to 
outperform humans in some cognitive tasks. Once again, workers fear 
their jobs will be lost to machines, and the digital revolution has still 
to play out, meaning their fears cannot be dismissed. The way work is 
performed is also changing, with jobs allocated via online platforms 
and people matched to tasks in a way that means they are neither full-
time employees, nor self-employed workers in the traditional sense.
This all has practical implications for welfare states. The European 
Union, where welfare-state spending is a substantial part of the 
economy, faces the major challenge of redefining the nature and 
functioning of its welfare states in the context of the fundamental 
changes brought about by digitalisation, artificial intelligence and 
the changing status of workers. EU policymakers must find answers 
to pressing questions: if technology has a negative impact on labour 
income, how will the welfare state be funded? How can workers’ 
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welfare rights be adequately secured?
A team of Bruegel scholars, with the support of the Mastercard 
Center for Inclusive Growth, has taken on these questions. They find 
that the risk digitalisation poses to jobs should not be overstated. 
For sure, it will change the nature of work, but will lead to the reallo-
cation of workers from existing jobs and tasks to new ones, with the 
potential for an overall positive effect. However, the share of national 
income going to labour appears to be falling and the funding of welfare 
systems needs to be rethought. EU countries will have to make critical 
choices about their welfare systems in the next few years. This volume 
will help them to focus on the core issues.
Guntram Wolff, Director of Bruegel
Brussels, June 2019
1 The future of work: an 
introduction
Rapid technological progress and innovation can threaten employ-
ment. This is not a new concern. John Maynard Keynes in 1930 
postulated his technological unemployment theory1 on the loss of 
jobs caused by technological change. He noted that “from the earliest 
times of which we have record – back, say, to two thousand years before 
Christ – down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no 
very great change in the standard of life of the average man living in the 
civilised centres of the earth.” But in the sixteenth century, scientific 
progress started to enable the development of new theories and tech-
nologies that would eventually lead to the Industrial Revolution. 
Morris (2011) considered the most important of these technologies 
to be James Watt’s steam engine in the second half of the eighteenth 
century. Prior to Watt, steam engines were highly inefficient, harness-
ing only about one percent of the energy released by burning coal. 
Watt managed to increase the efficiency of steam engines more than 
threefold between 1765 and 1776. That was the beginning of a period 
of technological progress that saw the birth of an industrial sector 
1 Similar concerns have existed since at least the fourth century BC, when Aristotle, in 
his Politics said that the human condition largely depends on what machines can and 
cannot do: “If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating 
the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says 
the poet, ‘of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods’; if, in like manner, the 
shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief 
workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves.” 
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that absorbed much of the workforce that left the agricultural sector 
– the first Industrial Revolution. Then, during the second Industrial 
Revolution, which is typically dated from around 1870, electricity, 
petroleum and steel became dominant. Telephones, lightbulbs, the 
radio and combustion engines are a few examples of inventions from 
this period. 
During the Industrial Revolution, humanity overcame the limi-
tations of human and animal muscle power and began to generate 
massive amounts of energy in a more efficient manner. That led to 
the development of mass production techniques, well-organised and 
efficient factory units, and railways and mass transportation sys-
tems – and to exploding populations, GDP, energy intensity, transport 
systems and greenhouse-gas emissions. Through these developments, 
standards of living were significantly improved and the foundations for 
modern life and the modern economy were built. But, such techno-
logical developments also created concerns about their impact on 
work. The Luddites, a group of English textile workers afraid of losing 
their jobs because of new labour-saving technologies, were the first 
to organise against technological advancements. Active in the second 
decade of the eighteenth century, they were suppressed by the British 
government, including through use of troops. 
Keynes’ technological unemployment theory is based on the 
increase in technical efficiency place faster than the problem of labour 
absorption can be dealt with. Nevertheless, Keynes concluded that this 
would be only a temporary misalignment because in the long-run the 
mankind is solving its economic problems.
Keynes, in fact, managed to correctly interpret the implications 
of such technologies. The experience of the Industrial Revolution 
showed that automation of production processes led to extraordi-
nary efficiency gains but also resulted to the displacement of labour. 
The underlying pattern suggested that while in the short-run the 
displacement effect might dominate, in the longer run, the gains in 
efficiency pay off through the creation of more jobs. The introduction 
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of automobiles in daily transportation led to a significant decline in 
horse-related jobs. However, new industries emerged resulting in a 
positive impact on employment. It was not only that the automobile 
industry itself grew rapidly, increasing the available jobs in the sector. 
Jobs were also created in different sectors because of the growing 
number of vehicles on the roads. For example, new jobs were created 
in the motel and fast-food industries that arose to serve motorists and 
truck drivers2. 
After the second world war and the subsequent period of extraor-
dinary growth and widespread welfare improvements, low levels of 
unemployment perhaps seemed to confirm Keynes’ optimism about 
the solution to the economic problem, making the threat of techno-
logic unemployment seem less urgent. But in the 1960s, automation 
and joblessness returned as a primary issue. In 1961, TIME magazine 
published ‘The Automation Jobless’, an article focusing on the possi-
bility that automation would not create enough new jobs, in particular 
for unskilled workers increasingly replaced by machinery3. In 1962, US 
president John F. Kennedy said “the major domestic challenge … of the 
1960s [is] to maintain full employment at a time when automation … 
is replacing men”4. In 1964, his successor Lyndon Johnson established 
the Blue-Ribbon National Commission on Technology, Automation 
and Economic Progress, to study the reciprocal interactions between 
productivity, labour and automation. The 14 members of the com-
mission concluded that technological progress did not pose a crucial 
threat to American employment, on the basis that, as its chairman 
Howard R. Bowen reckoned, “technology eliminates jobs, not work” 
(Bowen and Mangum, 1966).
2 For further examples, see The Economist (2016) ‘Automation and Anxiety’, Special 
Report, 23 June.
3 TIME, 24 February 1961, available at http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/arti-
cle/0,33009,828815-1,00.html.
4 Comments at a 14 February 1962 news conference; see https://www.jfklibrary.org/ar-
chives/other-resources/john-f-kennedypress-conferences/news-conference-24. 
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We are now going through an unprecedented digitalisation of our 
economy, in which computers and information technologies play a 
primary role. Thanks to rise of computing power we have been intro-
duced to an era in which artificial intelligence has become a reality 
and machines are able learn how to become better and outperform 
humans in a series of cognitive tasks. Scientific development has pro-
gressed quickly, and combinations of different scientific fields have led 
to progress that was hardly thinkable by previous generations. While 
the transition from horses to automobiles as a means of transportation 
created plenty of jobs with the development of a new industry, we are 
now in a new transition phase towards self-driving cars. The crucial 
question is whether the efficiency gains from the new technologies 
will, as they did in the past, dominate this time or whether displace-
ment of jobs will prevail. 
Since the development of personal computers in the early 1980s, 
we have seen their transformative power in almost every sector of the 
economy. We are now at the beginning of an even larger and more 
rapid transformation because of recent advances in machine learning, 
which is capable of accelerating the pace of automation itself. While 
machine learning, a basic ingredient of the artificial intelligence (AI) 
era, is a general purpose technology, as was steam engine technology 
that led to the Industrial Revolution, it is not fully clear yet what its 
implications will be for workers and employment.
Will robots and AI steal our jobs? How far into the new techno-
logical revolution are we? Are we on the verge of it, or has it already 
changed the economy substantially? If the nature of our production 
processes is changing, what will work look like in the future? Will the 
welfare state be able to cope in the face of the digital revolution? In this 
Blueprint, we attempt to answer these questions from an economic 
perspective. Our focus is on the European Union and on the impact of 
digitisation, digitalisation and AI on the welfare state.
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1.1 The speed of technological progress
In 2018, every minute of every day, there were 3.9 million Google 
searches, more than four million videos viewed on YouTube, twelve 
million text messages sent, 50,000 pictures uploaded to Instagram, 
almost half a million tweets written and more than a thousand items 
bought on Amazon5.
Many technologies that were once unthinkable are now creating 
and destroying industries. They are so pervasive and ubiquitous they 
have changed the way we access information, communicate and work.
A number of well-known laws help to explain the pace of techno-
logical progress. Moore’s Law has provided an accurate indicator of 
how many transistors, the semiconductors that serve as the building 
blocks of any electronic system, can be installed in the same space. 
Moore predicted that the number of transistors per circuit would 
double every two years. Figure 1.1 shows how the number of transis-
tors per circuit has grown exponentially. 
Figure 1.1: Moore’s Law – number of transistors per circuit
Source: Roser and Ritchie (2019).
5 Domo, ‘Data never sleeps 6.0’, available at https://www.domo.com/learn/data-nev-
er-sleeps-6.
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The speed at which we can send information has also skyrocketed. 
Since the late 1990s, increased connectivity and broadband capacity 
have made it possible to exchange huge volumes of data in fractions of 
seconds.
Panels A and B of Figure 1.2 show the speed of microprocessors 
(measured in hertz) and the internet traffic volume, forecast to 2022. 
Figure 1.2: Exponential growth in microprocessing speed and internet traffic
Source: Top panel: Roser and Ritchie (2019). Lower panel: Cisco (2018). 
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Since the invention of the internet, the number of connected 
devices has increased, and will increase much more with the devel-
opment of the Internet of Things. Devices communicate thanks to 
the Internet Protocol (IP), which identifies and locates them on the 
network. The major version of this protocol, IPv4, set the theoretical 
limit for IP addresses to more than 4.2 billion (232). In 2017, to avoid the 
exhaustion of IP addresses, the latest version of the Internet Protocol 
(IPv6) was ratified as a standard, allowing for 2128 (or 3.4×1038) IP 
addresses. 
A further law, Metcalfe’s Law states that being connected to a net-
work becomes more valuable, in terms of possible numbers of connec-
tions to each node, with the square of the size of the network, while the 
cost of joining falls. As a result, online networks tend to get very big, 
very fast. Figure 1.3 shows the quadratic expansion in network value 
for each increase in the number of nodes.
Figure 1.3: Metcalfe’s Law
Source: Bruegel.
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explodes as people try to get rich by working through the nearly infinite 
combinations of digital components in search of valuable digital prod-
ucts” (Baldwin, 2018). In this context, open-source software and open 
data are the staple building blocks of the value-generation chain for 
the digital economy.
1.2 Perceptions of technological change in Europe and the US
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, technological develop-
ment brings with it human concern about what the impacts will be. 
A 2017 Pew Research Center survey on technology and society found 
that 72 percent of Americans said they were worried when asked 
about a future in which robots and computers can do many human 
jobs. According to Eurobarometer data, 74 percent of Europeans feel 
that because of robots and AI, more jobs will disappear than will be 
created, while 72 percent think robots will steal their jobs. However, 
interestingly, a far smaller percentage believes that their own job is at 
risk: only 44 percent think that their job could be done by a machine or 
artificial intelligence (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.4: Results of public opinion surveys, EU and US
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2017), and Pew Research Center 
(2017).
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Fast and Horvitz (2017) studied the perception of AI using the 
New York Times archives as a proxy for public opinion. They found an 
explosion of articles about AI after 2009, most containing optimistic 
perspectives. However, they also showed that concern about “loss 
of control” and a negative sentiment in articles about AI mentioning 
“work” increased after 2005. 
We queried Google Books, which permits full text searches of all 
indexed works, for the terms ‘artificial intelligence and ‘robots’ in four 
different languages (English, French, German, Italian). We found the 
frequency of use of the terms has risen since the 1970s, with spikes 
in the late 1980s (Figure 1.5). In the English-language books, the two 
terms were used with similar frequency, while for books in the other 
three languages, ‘robots’ is more common. In Italian and French-
language books there was a relatively big spike for ‘robots’ in the late 
1980s, followed by a sharp decline and a slower increase from the 
beginning of the 2000s. In Germany use of the term ‘roboter’ contin-
ued growing rapidly since the middle of the 1990s.
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Figure 1.5: Frequency of the terms ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘robots’ in books 
in selected languages
Source: Bruegel based on Google Ngram Viewer.
1.3 Platform work
Platform work, or work allocated via online applications, is an impor-
tant emerging aspect of the digital revolution. With platform work, 
supply and demand for certain tasks are matched digitally. Pesole et al 
(2018) estimated the number of platform workers in Europe based on 
survey results from 14 member states. Figure 1.6 shows the fraction of 
the adult population that has ever performed platform work6.
6 Any respondent who said that he or she had ever gained income from one of the two follow-
ing online sources was deemed to have participated in platform work: “providing services 
via online platforms, where you and the client are matched digitally, payment is conducted 
digitally via the platform and the work is location-independent, web-based”; or “providing 
services via online platforms, where you and the client are matched digitally, and the pay-
ment is conducted digitally via the platform, but work is performed on-location”.
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Figure 1.6: Share of platform workers in the total labour force in EU countries
Source: Pesole et al (2018). Note: Fraction of the adult population that has ever gained 
income from platform work in surveyed EU member states, 2017  Data from the 2017 
COLLEEM Survey.
Knowing that an individual gained income at least once from 
platform work tells us nothing about how important platform work is 
to the individual. Pesole et al (2018) estimated that only 6 percent of 
those who have gained income from platform work earn more than 25 
percent of their income via platforms, and only 2 percent of those who 
have gained income earn more than 50 percent of their income via 
platforms.
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1.4 The labour market
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the debate on the impact of these new 
technologies on the labour market and on welfare states. Current 
technology-related developments should be viewed in the context of 
the numbers for general employment in Europe returning to pre-crisis 
levels. Employment rates at the time of writing are exceptionally high, 
which is good news because welfare states are to a significant degree 
funded from taxes and levies on employment. Welfare state spend-
ing is a substantial share of GDP in the European Union, amounting 
to 31.2 percent in France, 27.9 percent in Italy and 25.1 percent in 
Germany (Figure 1.7).
Figure 1.7: Social spending in Europe in 2018 (percent of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on OECD data.
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But despite high employment, the share of national income going to 
labour appears to be falling around the world and in the EU (Figure 
1.8). The trend is clear for Germany, Italy and France. This distribution 
of national income raises the question of who is taxed to fund the state 
and the welfare state in particular.
Figure 1.8: The declining labour share of national income
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/).
In fact, revenues from taxation of capital income have been quite 
constant for the past forty years – despite a rising share of capital 
income. Accordingly, the average and the marginal tax rates on capital 
income have fallen quite significantly. Overall, labour income taxa-
tion and value added taxation continue to make up the bulk of state 
finance.
The labour market is changing, and the very nature of work is trans-
forming under the pressures of scientific and technological progress 
and of globalisation. How will changes to employment contracts affect 
the welfare state? And if technology has a negative impact on labour 
income, how will the welfare state be funded? The key question then 
becomes how taxation of capital income should be rethought. It is 
exactly in this context that there is a growing need for a debate on the 
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readiness of welfare states to adapt. 
One of the key challenges of the twenty-first century will be to 
redefine the nature of welfare states, the way they are constructed and 
function, in light of the fundamental changes brought about by AI and 
other aspects of the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. This book 
aims to make a contribution to this debate.
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2 Automation and employment
Technological development, and in particular, digitalisation, or the use 
of digital technologies to change a business model and provide new 
revenue and value-producing opportunities, has major implications 
for labour markets. Assessing the impact of digitalisation on employ-
ment is very important as a basis for deriving specific policy recom-
mendations that can lead to the efficient functioning of the labour 
market for the benefit of workers, employers and society as a whole.
In this chapter we review the impact of automation on labour 
markets so far. We begin by reporting some relevant empirical facts 
on labour markets and technological progress and we then provide 
insights from general equilibrium theory and its empirical counter-
parts on the impact of automation on employment. 
2.1 Underlying trends in EU labour markets
The employment rate in Europe and in the world has been vola-
tile depending on macroeconomic factors that have impacted the 
economy. In Europe specifically, after the major overturn during the 
euro-area crisis, the employment rate is again increasing towards the 
pre-crisis levels (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Total employment (% of population 15 years old and over), 
1990-2016
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO (NETD, NPAN and NPON).
However, the same does not apply in the industrial sector, including 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying and supply of electricity, gas 
and water. 
Figure 2.2: Industrial employment (% of total employment), 1991-2017
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank, World Development Indicators (SL.IND.EMPL.
ZS). Note: Industry includes manufacturing, mining and quarrying and electricity, gas 
and water supply.
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In fact, there is a consensus that labour’s share of national income 
is declining7. Labour’s income share in the EU15 is now almost 5 per-
centage points lower than in 1960 (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3: Wage share in total economy (% of GDP), 1960-2017
Source: AMECO (ALCD0). Note: Wage share is defined as compensation per employee 
as a percentage of GDP at market prices per person employed.
An alternative explanation for labour’s decreasing income share 
was proposed by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017, 2018) who reported 
that mark-ups8 have substantially increased since 1980. This is par-
ticularly true for Europe and US. From an examination of the financial 
statements of more than 70,000 firms in 134 countries, the authors 
showed that the mark-up that European businesses charge over their 
marginal costs increased from roughly zero in 1980 to 64 percent 
in 2016. The jump – particularly pronounced in Denmark, Italy and 
7 See Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and OECD (2012, 2015) for a global analysis; 
Elsby et al (2013) for a discussion of the US labour share; and Arpaia et al (2009) for 
Europe. See also Berger and Wolff (2017) for relevant discussion and an illustration of the 
potential shortcomings behind the method for calculating labour shares.
8 Defined as the ratio of the price of output goods and the marginal cost of production, or in 
other words, as the margin of revenue over variable costs.
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Belgium – is even higher than in the US.
In the same vein, Autor et al (2017) built a ‘superstar firm’ model in 
which industries are increasingly characterised by ‘winner takes most’ 
competition, resulting in a small number of highly profitable (and low 
labour-share) firms commanding growing market shares. Autor et al 
(2017) evaluated and confirmed two core claims of the superstar firm 
hypothesis: the concentration of sales among firms within industries 
has risen across much of the private sector; and industries with larger 
increases in concentration exhibit a greater decline in labour’s income 
share.
Since wages are the outcome of the bargaining game between firms 
and workers, greater market power on the part of firms could also 
imply greater bargaining power when they negotiate wages with work-
ers and worker organisations, potentially shifting wages away from 
labour productivity. Labour productivity (measured by gross value 
added per worker) is rising both in the EU and the US (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Gross value added per hour worked in total economy (2000=100), 
1990-2017
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO (OVGE and NLHT). Note: no data available for EU28 
before 2000.
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However, by comparing wage growth and productivity for the 
period 2014-16 for EU countries (Figure 2.5), we see that real wage 
growth has lagged behind average productivity growth in several 
countries. Ireland’s productivity growth is much higher than average 
because of a revision to GDP statistics. In Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria real compensation growth exceeded 
productivity growth. In Greece, productivity and wage growth were 
both negative for the period, whereas for the United Kingdom, 
Portugal, Italy, Cyprus and Croatia, real compensation growth was 
negative but general productivity stagnated or increased. This gap is 
present, though less pronounced, for Hungary, Belgium and Finland.
Figure 2.5: Wage growth and productivity growth for EU countries, 2014-16
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2017). 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show the changes in employment rate and 
wages adjusted for inflation for the different EU regions (NUTS-2 level, 
as defined by Eurostat), between 1995 and 2015. Because of data limi-
tations, Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Croatia are not included. The 
figures show that the employment rate has been particularly reduced 
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in south-east EU regions (with the notable exception the southern 
regions of Bulgaria), which are little automated. Real wages have 
increased particularly in eastern Europe, achieving some convergence 
with central and western Europe where increases (on average) are 
more moderate.
Figure 2.6: Change in employment rates between 1995 and 2015
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/).
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Figure 2.7: Change in real wages between 1995 and 2015
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/).
2.2 Trends in technology adoption in Europe
Technological advancement requires the adoption of new efficient 
technologies by industry. Two main indicators of automated technol-
ogies have featured extensively in the literature: the number of indus-
trial robots and information and communication technologies (ICT).
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An industrial robot is defined as “an automatically controlled, 
reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or 
more axes, which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in indus-
trial automation applications” (International Federation of Robotics, 
2016). In line with this definition, a classification test would have 
required a positive answer to the following three questions:
• Does it have multiple purposes?
• Can it be reprogrammed to perform another task? 
• Can it perform its tasks without requiring human control?
While our coffee machine, or the elevator at an apartment building, 
would not pass this classification test, fully autonomous machines 
that do not need a human operator and that can be programmed to 
perform several manual tasks, such as welding, painting, assembling, 
handling materials or packaging, are classified as industrial robots. 
The same applies for a robot used in car production that satisfies these 
criteria.
The number of industrial robots used in production globally is 
increasing with a significant upward trend. More than 1 million robots 
are at work in the Asian markets, mostly concentrated in China and 
Japan (with 2016 being the first year in which the number of active 
industrial robots in China exceeded the respective number in Japan). 
However, the robots market is still quite small compared with the gen-
eral picture. Investment in robots, expressed as a percentage of total 
gross-fixed capital formation, is 0.19 percent in Europe, compared 
to 0.8 percent in South Korea, 0.45 percent in Japan, 0.18 percent in 
China and 0.11 percent in the United States.
For the five largest European economies, we estimated the invest-
ments in robots by calculating a global average market price for a 
single robot, and deriving the market size in each country by multi-
plying this price by the number of industrial robots in the country. 
Germany scored highest with investments in robots taking a 0.31 
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percent share of total gross fixed capital formation, followed by Italy, 
Spain, France and the United Kingdom.
Figure 2.8: Investments in industrial robots as a percentage of total gross fixed 
capital formation
Source: Bruegel based on IFR (2018) and OECD.
Figure 2.9: Investments in industrial robots as a percentage of total gross fixed 
capital formation, selected countries
Source: Bruegel based on IFR data (2018).
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Although these numbers testify that investments in robots are still 
very modest, estimates of market growth (Figure 2.10), are larger than 
for investment overall, with a positive general increase, in particular 
for China, where investment in robots is expected to increase by 20 
percent between 2017 and 2018, and by 27 percent between 2018 and 
2019.
Figure 2.10: Investments in robots
Source: Bruegel based on IFR data (2018).
In terms of the density of robots (ie the number of industrial robots 
per thousand workers), we can see that the EU is ahead of the US in 
the use of robots in industrial production, with 1.90 robots per thou-
sand workers in 2016 (Figure 2.12). The density of robots is steadily 
increasing as EU industries introduce more and more robots into their 
production chains. The density of robots is decreasing in Japan, the 
first economy to be significantly robotised in 1980s. By the early 2000s, 
Japan had been significantly robotised, so the rate of introduction 
of new robotic systems decreased. In combination with population 
growth, this led to a decrease in robot density.
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Figure 2.11: Industrial robots by country (in thousands)
Source: IFR.
Figure 2.12: Industrial robots per thousand workers by country
Source: IFR and ILO.
The EU’s lead in comparison to other regions of the world can be 
attributed to its strong automobile sector, where more than 200,000 
robots take part in the production process (Figure 2.13). Nevertheless, 
when we take into account recent trends, it can be seen that the 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
ChinaUnited States
EUJapan
Asia (ex. China and Japan)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
China
United States
EU
Japan (right scale)
Asia (ex. China and Japan)
34 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 30
intensity of robotisation has shifted beyond motor vehicles, into sec-
tors that are less ‘mature’ in terms of automation, such as machinery, 
food and beverage and utilities (Figure 2.15).
Figure 2.13: Industrial robots by sector in thousands, 2015
Source: IFR (2017).
Figure 2.14: Robots per 1000 workers by country, 2015
Source: IFR (2017) and Eurostat.
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Figure 2.15: Median annual growth rate of operating industrial robots, by 
industry
Source: Bruegel based on IFR (2017).
Countries with a strong automotive presence, including Germany, 
Italy and Sweden, are the champions in terms of employment of 
industrial robots (Figure 2.14). But, interestingly, it was in Romania, 
Lithuania, Estonia and Poland where growth in the number of indus-
trial robots was fastest between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 2.16), suggest-
ing moves in these countries towards more efficient production lines.
Figure 2.17 shows the change in the number of robots per thousand 
workers between 1995 and 2015. As expected, the density of robots was 
highest in regions that are heavily industrialised, especially in regions 
that specialise in the production of automobiles. The most signifi-
cant increases were found for the NUTS-2 regions of Braunschweig 
(Volkswagen), Stuttgart (Audi, Porsche, Mercedes Benz), Piedmont 
(FIAT), Navarre (Seat), Franche-Comté (a big industrial region in 
France) and Strední Cechy (Central Bohemia, Skoda).
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Figure 2.17: Change in density of robots between 1995 and 2015, per thousand 
workers
Source: Bruegel based on IFR (2017).
As for ICT, we use relevant data from EU KLEMS (http://www.euk-
lems.net/). For our ICT capital measure we combine information and 
communication capital with software and databases asset value, at the 
industry level.
A first observation is that the percentage of Europeans that access, 
use and purchase through the internet has significantly increased in 
the last decade (Figure 2.18).
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Figure 2.18: Percentage of EU population accessing, using and purchasing via 
the internet in the last 12 months
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
There is a difference in the level of investment in information 
and communication technologies and in software and databases in 
different EU countries (Figure 2.19). The real fixed capital stock of ICT 
is highest in Luxembourg, while the respective stock of software and 
databases is highest in France.
The Baltic states, especially Estonia and Lithuania, have grown their 
investments in ICT while northern EU countries including Finland and 
Denmark adopted a considerable amount of databases and software 
technologies between 2005 and 2014 (Figure 2.20).
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Figure 2.19: Real fixed capital stock (thousand € per worker), 2014
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/). Note: 2010 prices.
Figure 2.20: Average annual growth rate in ICT, software and databases capital 
stock (%)
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS (http://www.euklems.net/). Note: capital stock 
expressed in real terms (2010 prices); missing bars due to unavailable data.
World Economic Forum (2018) reported the results of a survey in 
which companies from eastern and western Europe were asked what 
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between eastern and western Europe. The vast majority of companies 
operating in Europe indicated that they are likely or very likely to adopt 
big data analytics (more than 90 percent), machine learning (77 per-
cent in eastern Europe and 79 percent in western Europe) and cloud 
computing technologies (more than 70 percent).
2.3 The impact of automation on EU labour markets: theory
To assess the impact of automation on labour markets we first look 
at the predictions of general equilibrium theory, and then at empiri-
cal work related to European markets. Theoretical models have built 
on Autor et al (2003). In particular, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) 
derived specific predictions and insights about the different impacts 
of automation. These models use a task-based approach to illustrate 
how computer systems and intelligent machines effect employment 
and wages. The central unit of production is a task. Production takes 
place through the simultaneous completion of a range of tasks. Some 
of these tasks have to be done by labour, while other tasks can be done 
either by labour or by capital. Also, for different tasks, labour and 
capital have comparative advantages, meaning that the relative pro-
ductivity of labour varies for different tasks. Automation is modelled 
as an expansion in the set of tasks that can be carried out by capital. 
If capital is sufficiently cheap or sufficiently productive at the margin, 
then automation will lead to the substitution of capital for labour for 
these tasks. This substitution results in a displacement of workers from 
the tasks that are being automated, creating the so-called displace-
ment effect. This could trigger a decline in the demand for labour and 
the equilibrium wage rate. With an elastic labour supply, this decrease 
in demand for labour also leads to lower employment. 
However, automation also feeds into other economic mecha-
nisms that can typically positively influence employment and wages 
(Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c):
1. Productivity effect: the demand for labour in non-automated tasks 
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can increase as the cost of performing routine tasks falls as a result 
of automation. This productivity effect can lead to an increase in 
the demand for labour in the sectors undergoing automation and 
in non-automating sectors. In this way, greater real incomes can be 
achieved and therefore greater demand for goods, including those 
not experiencing automation. A good example (Bessen, 2016) is 
the employment growth among bank workers that happened after 
automated teller machines (ATMs) were introduced. ATMs reduced 
costs and, because demand for banking services was elastic, more 
branches could open and more sophisticated non-routine servic-
es could be rolled out. Other examples of occupations in which 
employment surged after major technological innovation include 
check-out cashiers and paralegals. 
2. Capital accumulation: automation triggers more capital investment 
which increases labour demand because more workers are needed 
to work with the machines. According to Allen (2016), rapid capital 
accumulation might have been an important channel for the ad-
justment the British economy in the face of the mechanisation of 
agriculture during the Industrial Revolution. 
3. Deepening of automation: technological improvements can in-
crease the productivity of capital in tasks that have already been 
automated. In that case, labour will not be displaced further but 
the productivity effects of this type of ‘intensive margin’ auto-
mation can increase labour demand (productivity effect through 
already-automated tasks). An example is the vast improvements in 
the efficiency of numerically-controlled machines used for met-
al cutting and processing during the 1970s (earlier vintages were 
controlled by punched cards and were not fully computerised). 
While the improvements are not considered to have significant 
displacement effects because such tasks were already automated, 
they increased the productivity of operators and other workers in 
the industry.
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These three effects are unlikely to counterbalance the negative dis-
placement effect (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018c): automation makes 
the production process more capital intensive and tends to increase 
productivity more than the wages (Figure 2.5), with the consequence 
of reducing the labour’s share of national income (Figure 2.3). This 
implies that because automation entails the substitution of capital for 
tasks previously performed by labour, thus squeezing labour into a 
narrower set of tasks.
IMF (2017) reported that in advanced economies, about half of 
the decline in labour’s income share could be traced to the impact of 
technology – a combination of rapid progress in information and tele-
communications, and a high share of occupations that could be easily 
be automated9.
This is is also consistent with historical observations as, for exam-
ple, Allen (2009) shows: in Britain from the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution until the middle of the nineteenth century, wages stag-
nated and the labour share of income fell, even as technological 
advances and productivity growth continued, a phenomenon called 
“Engel’s pause”.
However, from the start of the twentieth-century, the mechani-
sation of the economy led to a great increase in employment as new 
industries and factories were created and the era of mass production 
got underway (Kuznets, 1966). Also, as documented by Acemoglu and 
Restrepo (2018a), from 1980 to 2010, the introduction and expansion 
of new tasks and job titles explained about half of employment growth. 
So, a fourth important effect, which might be the most powerful force 
9 Karabarbounis and Neiman (2015) linked the global decline of the labour share 
to the global decline in the relative price of  investment goods, and argued that 
this could explain about half of the fall. The decline of labour’s income share 
in advanced economies has been particularly sharp for middle-skilled labour. 
Routine-biased technology has taken over many of the tasks performed by these 
workers, contributing to job polarisation toward high-skilled and low-skilled occu-
pations. 
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to balance the rapid growth of automation, is the so-called:
4. Reinstatement effect: automation in some areas can open up the 
space for new, labour-intensive tasks to be created. This is be-
cause labour is needed to work adjacent to, and to service, more 
sophisticated machines and because technology can create entire 
new classes of jobs. It always generates additional labour demand, 
which notably increases the labour share of national income. Con-
sequently, one powerful way in which technological progress could 
be associated with a balanced growth path is through the balancing 
of the impacts of automation with the creation of new tasks.
So, in terms of its productivity and reinstatement effects, automa-
tion should be viewed as a technological force that changes the nature 
of existing jobs, and leads to the reallocation of workers from existing 
jobs and tasks to new ones. But, as Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) 
explain, this is a complex and often slow process. First, it takes time 
for workers to adjust to the new reality and find new jobs and tasks in 
which they can be productive. Second, local and national labour mar-
kets can be depressed at the time workers are fired from their existing 
jobs (during the adjustment period). So, adjustment costs increase 
because of the impact of automation. This explains why historically 
we can separate (through Engel’s pause) the effects of automation on 
labour markets in the short and long runs10.
2.4 The impact of automation on EU labour markets: empirical 
evidence
While theory outlines the different forces of technology, empirical 
facts illustrate the overall impact of automation on employment and 
indicate which of the opposing effects dominate.
10 In chapter 6 we discuss policy initiatives to reduce such adjustment costs and make 
the transition process weaker.
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We built a dataset with information about employment rates, real 
wages, industrial robots (per thousand workers) and ICT capital (per 
thousand workers) at regional level (NUTS-2 level) in the EU. We 
defined exposure to robots as the ratio between the number of indus-
trial robots and the number of workers. The ICT measure was con-
structed in the same manner: ICT capital per thousand workers; for 
ICT capital, we used the asset value of ICT, software and databases in 
each region.
We examined the relationship between the change in the regional 
employment rate and real wages between 1995 and 2015, and the 
change in regional exposure to the two technology variables during the 
same period (Figures 2.21-2.24).
Figure 2.21: Exposure to industrial robots relative to employment rate in EU 
regions for the total economy
Source: Bruegel. Note: Each circle depicts a distinct region (NUTS-2 level). The diame-
ter of each circle indicates the size of working population within the region.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
AT
BE
BG
CZ
DE
EE
GR
ES
FR
HU
IE
IT
LT
LV
NL
PL
PT
RO
SE
SK
UK
Exposure to robots
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
ch
an
ge
45 | DIGITALISATION AND EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
Figure 2.22: Exposure to industrial robots relative to wages in EU regions for the 
total economy
Source: Bruegel. Note: see note to Figure 2.21.
Figure 2.23: Exposure to ICT capital, software and databases relative to 
employment rate in EU regions for the total economy
Source: Bruegel. Note: see note to Figure 2.21.
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Figure 2.24: Exposure to ICT capital, software and databases relative to wages 
in EU regions for the total economy
Source: Bruegel. Note: see note to Figure 2.21.
Exposure to industrial robots and ICT capital are both positively 
correlated with employment rates. On average, a marginal increase in 
a region’s exposure to industrial robots is associated with an increase 
in the employment rate of 1 percentage point. A marginal increase in 
the exposure to ICT capital has a similar effect on employment rates. 
As for real wages, there is a negative correlation with exposure to 
industrial robots, suggesting that an additional robot per 1000 workers 
corresponds to a reduction of 3 percentage points in the growth rate 
of real hourly wages. However, the correlation with exposure to ICT 
is positive, suggesting that different automated technologies interact 
with wages in different ways. Robots by nature reduce labour demand 
for specific physical tasks and therefore can potentially reduce wages. 
ICT, on the other hand, appears to be more complementary to labour 
tasks, increasing the efficiency with which these tasks are performed 
and thus increasing employment opportunities.  
The same methodology is applied here as in Chiacchio et al (2018), 
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but Chiacchio et al (2018) found the overall impact on employment 
rates of exposure to robots to be negative. In trying to explain this 
difference, we would point out that we incorporated more recent data 
up to 2015, while Chiacchio et al (2018) considered 2007 as a final year 
because of data limitations. Moreover, while in Chiacchio et al (2018) 
only six countries were covered, we extended the study by incorpo-
rating up to 21 EU countries (Figures 23-26), using a dataset of 245 
NUTS-2 regions, to study the relationship between employment rates 
and exposure to robots.
Chiacchio et al (2018) also assessed the impact of exposure to 
industrial robots on different demographic groups. They found, in 
particular, that the take-up of industrial robots has a greater displace-
ment effect on men and young people (aged 15-24 years), indicating 
that use of robots raises small barriers in terms of entry into EU labour 
markets and for more physical activities. In addition, Chiacchio et al 
(2018) divided the educational level of workers into three categories: 
(i) L, or lower secondary education; (ii) M, or at least upper secondary 
education; and (iii) H, or tertiary education. Chiacchio et al (2018) 
estimated that middle-skilled (or educated) workers are more likely to 
be adversely affected by technological change (statistically significant 
negative impact): the adoption of industrial robots leads to a negative 
statistically significant impact on middle-educated EU workers of 
more than 0.2 percentage points (Figure 2.25).
That partially confirms studies done in the United States (Autor et 
al, 2006) and the United Kingdom (Goos and Manning, 2007) which 
have shown that there is growth in employment in the highest-skilled 
(professional and managerial) and lowest-skilled (personal services) 
occupations, with declining employment in the middle of the distribu-
tion (manufacturing and routine office jobs). 
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Figure 2.25: Employment impact of exposure to robots by education group
Source: Chiacchio et al (2018). Note: The figure indicates change in employment rate 
arising from 1 additional robot per 1000 workers in the economy, in percentage points. 
Bars refer to the confidence interval of 90 percent.
Goos et al (2014), using data from 16 EU countries, found that 
job polarisation is pervasive in EU labour markets (ie jobs requiring 
a moderate level of skills seem to decrease relative to those at the 
bottom, requiring few skills, and those at the top, requiring greater skill 
levels). Figure 2.26 shows that employment polarisation is apparent 
across the full range of countries. Declines in the share of middle-pay-
ing occupations are in the 5-15 percent range for countries including 
France, Austria and the UK. The fact that this polarisation pattern is so 
common across countries underlines the routine-biased technological 
change hypothesis (job polarisation).
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Job polarisation is linked to technological change through the rou-
tine-biased technological change (RBTC) hypothesis, which has been 
supported by many studies: recent technological change is biased 
toward replacing labour in routine tasks. Moreover, there is also task 
offshoring (itself partially influenced by technological change). Both 
forces reduce the demand for middle-skilled workers relative to high-
skilled and low-skilled workers (Autor et al, 2003; Autor et al, 2006, 
2008; Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor and Dorn, 2013). Nevertheless, 
as Goos et al (2014) illustrated, for the EU, RBTC is much more impor-
tant than offshoring. Their model explains not just overall job polari-
sation but also its within-industry and between-industry components. 
As they noted:
Within each industry there is a shift away from routine occupa-
tions, leading to within-industry job polarisation. But RBTC also 
leads to significant between-industry shifts in the structure of 
employment. On the one hand, an industry affected by RBTC will 
use less employment to produce a given level of output which will 
cause occupational employment shares to polarise even if output 
shares do not. On the other hand, industries intense in routine 
tasks will see a larger decrease in relative costs and output prices 
leading to a shift in product demand towards these industries 
(Goos et al, 2014).
This effect reduces the impact of between-industry job polarisation 
but does not negate it. Such a between-industry shift is, for example, 
currently observed between the manufacturing and service sectors.
Last but not least, the positive relationship between employment 
rates and automation shown in Figures 2.21 and 2.23 refers to the over-
all impact of automation. By separating the different effects according 
to the theoretical predictions presented above, we arrive at Figure 2.27. 
We can decompose the overall impact of automation on employment 
into three different effects in line with the theory presented in section 
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4.The displacement effect as expected is negative, suggesting that 
labour demand has decreased by 1.64 million to 4.6 million jobs as 
technology has substituted for labour in routine tasks, and as produc-
tion has restructured towards routine tasks. However, the associated 
productivity effects are greater in absolute value, implying an increase 
in labour demand of 1.41 million to 4 million (productivity effect) and 
2 million to 5.6 million jobs (reinstatement effect) across Europe. So, 
the overall effect is small and positive as automation creates 1.79 mil-
lion to 5 million jobs.
Figure 2.27: Predicted European labour demand and employment change, 
1999-2010
Source: Bruegel based on Gregory et al (2018). Note: The blue bars show the number of jobs 
under the assumption that labour supply is perfectly elastic, which is inconsistent with an 
extensive literature finding finite supply elasticities. On the basis of this assumption, we 
derived an upper estimate of the impact of the effects of automation. If instead, a supply 
elasticity of 0.5 is considered, a more modest impact is estimated, as shown by the red bars.
Of particular interest from this decomposition of the overall effect 
of automation is that the net impact can only be positive if automa-
tion leads to the emergence of new categories of jobs (reinstatement 
effect). Clearly, this depends on our ability to transform technolog-
ical change into new forms of work. This requires: i) helping people 
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develop their skills in ways that enable them to perform the newly-cre-
ated tasks; ii) designing an appropriate framework that allows new 
forms of work to expand; and iii) distributing the resulted benefits in a 
fair way between social partners.
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3 Artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and their 
implications
3.1 Intelligent machines
The empirical results presented in chapter 2 refer to the impact of 
automation from the mid-1990s up to 2015. However, since about 
2010, there have been new advancements based on machine-learning 
techniques that enable artificial intelligence (AI) systems to perform 
tasks in a very efficient way. AI systems are able to perform tasks that 
involve decision-making, changing the impact of automation on the 
workforce. There is a concern that the displacement of workers will 
be reinforced by these new technologies. Given that the introduction 
and implementation of these technologies has only just started, there 
is so far no available data that can allow us to assess the magnitude of 
the displacement effect, or the scale of the countervailing productivity 
effects (expansion of current job tasks or creation of new ones).  
Software and AI-powered technologies can now retrieve informa-
tion, coordinate logistics, handle inventories, prepare taxes, provide 
financial services, translate complex documents, write business 
reports, prepare legal briefs and diagnose diseases. They are set to 
become much better at these tasks in the next few years (Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee, 2012; Ford, 2015). Currently, to assess the impact of these 
technologies in the labour market, we can only underline the main 
characteristics of these technologies and apply speculative feasibility 
tests to the potential job tasks that will be created and displaced.
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The idea of intelligent machines was developed in the early twenti-
eth century, with the idea of ‘human-like’ intelligence a key concept. 
Vannevar Bush in 1945 proposed “a system which amplifies people’s 
own knowledge and understanding”11. Alan Turing (1950) asked the 
question “Can machines think?” In his famous imitation game, Turing 
(1950) proposed a test of a machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent 
behaviour equivalent to that of a human. A human evaluator judges an 
exchange of printed messages between a human and a machine that 
is designed to generate human-like responses. The evaluator would be 
aware that one of the two partners in the exchange is a machine, and 
all participants would be separated from one another. If the evaluator 
cannot reliably tell the machine from the human, the machine is said 
to have passed the test.
The specific term “artificial intelligence” was first used by John 
McCarthy in his 1955 proposal for the first academic conference on 
the subject that took place in Dartmouth in the summer of 1956. 
However, the traditional approach to AI was not really about inde-
pendent machine learning. Instead the aim was to specify rules of 
logical reasoning and real-world conditions which machines could 
be programmed to react to. This approach was time consuming for 
programmers and its effectiveness relied heavily on the clarity of rules 
and definitions.
Modern AI has deviated from this approach by adopting the notion 
of machine learning. This shift follows in principle Turing’s recom-
mendation to teach a machine to perform specific tasks as if it were a 
child. By building a machine with sufficient computational resources, 
offering training examples from real-world data and designing spe-
cific algorithms and tools that define a learning process, rather than 
specific data manipulations, machines can improve their own perfor-
mance through learning-by-doing, inferring patterns and checking 
11 Vannevar Bush (1945) ‘As we may think’, The Atlantic, July, available at https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1945/07/as-we-may-think/303881/.
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hypotheses.
Thus it is no longer necessary to programme in advance long and 
complicated rules for a machine’s specific operations. Instead pro-
grammers can equip machines with flexible mechanisms that facilitate 
their adaptation to their task environment. At the core of this learning 
process are artificial neural networks (see section 2), inspired by the 
networks of neurons in the human brain. Nick Bostrom, a philosopher 
at Oxford University, even foresees the birth of a superintelligence, a 
form of machine intelligence that overtakes by far the capabilities of 
the human mind (Bostrom, 2017).
While the principles of machine learning were introduced several 
years ago, the great development of machine learning and AI systems 
has only started in the last decade, for the following reasons:
The volume of available data collected has increased significantly 
over the last decade and will continue to grow. AI systems have access 
to large datasets that help the training of machines so that they can 
improve the efficiency of their performance. The digitisation of nearly 
all media and the increasing migration of economic and social activ-
ities to the internet generate petabytes of data every second (OECD, 
2014). The speed of data processing has also increased and in some 
applications approaches real time (White House, 2014). In addition, 
the variety of data collected has also vastly expanded. The value of 
data and how informative it is has also increased. The fusion of many 
different kinds of data processed has the power to deliver the targeted 
messages, products or services (White House, 2014).  
There has been a significant increase in computing power and 
better connectivity through the internet. In particular, the supply 
and storage of digital information has increased, including in central 
locations (cloud computing), which allows significant amounts of data 
to be compared and analysed for the statistical purposes necessary to 
develop tools based on AI principles.
The drop in capital costs of digital technologies has significantly 
reduced barriers to entry for start-ups, making it less necessary than 
57 | DIGITALISATION AND EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
in the past to mobilise huge amounts of capital before starting a new 
venture. At the same time, incentives to invest first in new markets 
have increased because of network effects, and the value of collected 
data often leads to competition for the market instead of competition 
within the market. In Europe, the United Kingdom has the strongest AI 
ecosystem. Asgard (2017) counted 121 AI firms in the UK, with London 
clearly the largest hub. In second place is Germany (51), with Berlin as 
the main AI hub supporting 30 AI companies. France (39) and Spain 
(31) follow in third and fourth places.
Figure 3.1: The distribution of AI companies in Europe
Source: Asgard (2017).
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Analysis of patents can indicate which of the AI subfields are the 
most promising. There has been a rapid increase in AI patent appli-
cations to different patent offices worldwide (Figure 3.2). Within this, 
patent filing in the fields of machine learning and neural networks has 
boomed in recent years (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.2: Number of AI patents granted by country
Source: Bruegel based on Fujii and Managi (2018), Ernst et al (2018).
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Figure 3.3: Machine learning and neural networks patents (all vs granted)
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT. Note: Following the same methodology as Webb et 
al (2018).
A 2019 study by the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) illustrates the growth in the application of AI techniques 
(WIPO, 2019). Deep learning is the fastest growing application, with a 
175 percent increase in patents between 2013 and 2016.
In terms of functional applications of AI, WIPO (2019) shows that 
patent filings increased in particular in the field of computer vision 
(character recognition, biometrics, scene understanding, image and 
video segmentation, object tracking, augmented reality).
WIPO (2019) also shows that IBM is the leading AI patenter, 
with 8290 patents, followed by Microsoft with 5930, and by Toshiba, 
Samsung and NEC. Among universities, the largest numbers of patents 
are held by institutions in China and the Republic of Korea.
Europe still lags behind North America and Asia in terms of private 
investment in AI (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Private investment in AI, 2016 (€ billions)
Source: EU Digital Single Market Factsheet.
Figure 3.5: Percentage of AI publications by group and geographical origin
Source: Elsevier (2018).
Between 1998 and 2017, the number of scientific publications on 
AI increased substantially from fewer than 10,000 in 1998 to more than 
60,000 in 2017 (Elsevier, 2018, based on a sample of publications). 
There are strong regional differences in AI activity. Europe is still in 
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first place in AI research, despite rapid growth in China at the expense 
of the share of the US, which has regained some ground in recent years 
(Figure 3.5). 
3.2 AI algorithms: how they operate 
The most widely-applied structure of a machine-learning algorithm is 
a neural network. Artificial neural networks imitate the structure of the 
human brain rather than perform a standard statistical analysis. Usual 
statistical methods assume that different input variables have relatively 
simple and independent effects on the output variables that need to 
be explained. Artificial neural networks work differently. Rather than 
inputs directly and independently determining outputs, the inputs 
are combined in complex ways to create features of the phenomenon 
being studied, which in turn determine other features, which even-
tually determine the outcome. An artificial neural network is able to 
handle such sophisticated abstractions by learning the presence of 
more abstract features of data in its hidden layers (Figure 3.6).
Figure 3.6: A stylised neural network structure
Source: Posner and Weyl (2018).
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A simple artificial neuron network is organised in different layers 
of neurons (with each neuron depicted by a node in Figure 3.6). Data 
is introduced into the network through the input layer. There are some 
hidden layers in which information is processed and finally an output 
layer from which results emerge. Each neuron within the network 
has a set of weights and an activation function. A network with many 
hidden layers combines signals by applying different weights to them 
and passing the result to the next layer. The number of hidden layers is 
indicative of the ability of the network to detect increasingly subtle fea-
tures of the input data. The training of the network takes place through 
the adjustment of the weights given to neurons so that the network 
gives the desired response when presented with particular inputs. 
The learning of the machine through such a structure has some 
critical ingredients: 
• Data that consists of an extremely large collection of labelled ex-
amples: in the example of image recognition, data might refer to a 
large number of photographs tagged as containing or not contain-
ing a face. 
• Computing power: artificial neural networks are connected via 
multiple servers to perform the algorithmic computation.
• In the most widely implemented type of machine learning, super-
vised learning12, a third critical component is the programmers who 
supervise the process of learning and adjust the weighting function 
with which input variables are introduced into the algorithm to 
make the algorithm more efficient in order to achieve its objective 
more quickly and accurately.
12 In the supervised learning the main task is to learn some general function f(x)=y 
from a set of training examples of input-output (x,y). Supervised learning can be 
used when the objective is to train email servers to choose which emails should 
automatically go to the spam folder. Another task that can be learnt in this way is 
finding the most appropriate results for a query typed in a search engine.
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Such an algorithm has a specific objective and a repetitive func-
tion. Each time, it tries to improve its performance by adjusting the 
weighting function with which each input variable is taken into 
account. Through repetition, the algorithm learns how to reach the 
desired output. This is why it is important to have access to abundant 
high-quality representative training data. Through numerous tests, the 
algorithm can improve its accuracy leading to better results.
3.3 The main applications of AI systems
The combination of improved algorithms based on deep artificial 
neural networks and faster computer hardware has been critical for 
the development of machine learning. Machine learning has been 
quite effective in the following areas:
Object recognition  
Probably the most striking demonstration of machine learning is the 
ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge13, which evaluates 
algorithms for their capabilities in object detection and image classi-
fication at large scale. For any given word, ImageNet contains several 
hundred images. In the annual ImageNet contest, several research 
groups compete to get their computers to recognise and label images 
automatically. Humans on average label an image correctly 95 percent 
of the time. The respective number for the winning AI system in 2010 
was 72 percent, but over the next couple of years the error rate fell 
sharply. In 2015, machines managed to achieve 96 percent accuracy, 
reducing the error rate below the human average level for the first 
time.
13  See http://www.image-net.org/challenges/LSVRC/.
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Figure 3.7: Object detection accuracy in the ImageNet Visual Recognition 
Challenge
Source: Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC).
Visual question answering
While machines perform better than humans in identifying images as 
belonging to one of a thousand categories, humans can still recognise 
a larger number of categories and can also judge the context of an 
image in a more accurate way. The visual question answering (VQA) 
test is indicative of the current stage of progress of machines. The VQA 
dataset consists of images and open-ended questions about the con-
tent of those images. AI systems aim to produce answers to questions 
about images. Answering these questions requires an understanding 
of vision, language and common-sense knowledge. Despite the sig-
nificant progress made by AI systems, they still have not managed to 
surpass the accuracy of human performance. The accuracy of the best 
AI system is below 70 percent compared to 80 percent accuracy for 
humans, given the same amount of time to respond to a question.
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which can then be converted to text. A subset of speech recognition 
is voice recognition, which is the technology for identifying a person 
based on their voice. AI systems have managed to perform similarly to 
humans in a task to recognise speech from voice recordings.
Meanwhile, AI systems are also approaching the human level in 
question answering. They have also significantly improved their per-
formance in tasks such as natural language understanding, machine 
translation, theorem proving and playing cognitive games including 
Jeopardy!14, Go15 and chess16.
3.4 AI and its impact on jobs
While AI systems have already managed to perform better than 
humans in certain tasks, it should not be overlooked that workers 
perform a variety of different tasks17. As machines automate some of 
these tasks in particular jobs or processes, the remaining tasks that 
are non-automatable might become more valuable (Brynjolfsson and 
Mitchell, 2017). For example, in legal contexts, AI can perform well 
in classification tasks such as sorting large amounts of documents, 
but they cannot replace lawyers in formulating legal strategies (Levy 
and Remus, 2017). Machines are unable to represent clients in court. 
Lawyers can therefore allocate more time to preparation for the court 
and can become more efficient. We are still far from artificial general 
intelligence that would match humans in all cognitive areas.
Machines thus have the potential to replace workers and also 
to augment human capabilities by introducing new ways to make 
14 See the very illustrative story in Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014).
15 In March 2016, the AlphaGo computer program from the AI startup DeepMind 
(bought by Google in 2014) beat Lee Sedol in a five-game match of Go – the oldest 
board game, invented in China more than 2,500 years ago. This was the first time a 
computer Go program beat a 9-dan professional without handicaps.
16 In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue beat chess champion Garry Kasparov.
17 Occupations should be viewed as bundles of different tasks. The level of heteroge-
neity depends on the nature and type of each occupation. 
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work done by humans more efficient, which in turn increases labour 
demand. The question of whether the displacement or the pro-
ductivity effect will dominate is certainly very relevant for the new 
generation of technologies. For tasks that can be done on the basis 
of machine-learning capabilities, labour demand is more likely to 
fall. For tasks that cannot easily be performed by machines, labour 
demand is more likely to increase. For example, AI systems might 
replace lawyers’ assistants in the preparation of contracts and other 
paperwork and might help lawyers to have their files better-organised 
when they perform tasks that require their physical presence. Each 
time a machine-learning system crosses the threshold where for a par-
ticular task “it becomes more cost-effective than humans, profit-maxim-
ising companies will increasingly seek to substitute machines for people. 
This can have effects throughout the economy, boosting productivity, 
lowering prices, shifting labour demand and restructuring industries” 
(Brynjolfsson and Mitchell, 2017).
In assessing the implications of AI on the workforce, it is impor-
tant to fully understand the transformative power of AI. Even labour 
demand within the ICT sector will not remain unaffected. While 
previously, creating a new computer program required a significant 
contribution from computer programmers, machine-learning algo-
rithms trained by relevant data can now produce more accurate and 
higher-quality code and computer programs. At the same time, the 
costs of creating and maintaining new software can be drastically cut. 
Lower costs mean lower barriers to experimentation and exploration 
of the potential for computerisation of tasks, and will encourage the 
development of computer systems that will automate many types of 
routine workflows with little or no human intervention. 
Brynjolfsson and Mitchell (2017) identified eight key criteria for job 
tasks that are suitable for automation: 
1. A learning function can be constructed that maps well-defined 
inputs onto well-defined outputs; 
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2. Large relevant training datasets exist that enable the machine to 
learn and become more efficient in the provision of the task; 
3. The task provides clear feedback with clearly definable goals and 
metrics;
4. The provision of the task does not require long chains of logic or 
reasoning that depend on diverse background knowledge; 
5. It is not necessary to provide a detailed explanation of how the 
decision was made; 
6. There is a margin for error; 
7. The learning function should not change rapidly over time; 
8. No specialised physical skills or mobility are required.
Based on these criteria, Brynjolfsson et al (2018) moved one step 
further and evaluated the suitability for automation by AI systems in 
the US economy of specific tasks and work activities18. They found that 
the five occupations least suitable for machine learning were: massage 
therapists, animal scientists, archaeologists, public address system 
announcers and plasterers. The occupations most suitable for machine 
learning were brokerage clerks, credit authorisers, morticians, under-
takers and funeral directors, mechanical drafters and concierges 
(Brynjolfsson et al, 2018).
The exercise carried out by Brynjolfsson et al (2018) confirmed 
that many occupations include both tasks that are highly suitable 
for machine learning and tasks that are not. For approximately 400 
occupations, fewer than 10 percent of tasks have very high SML scores 
(meaning a risk of automation above 90 percent), while for fewer than 
200 occupations the percentage of tasks with equally high SML scores 
is around 20 percent.
18 Brynjolfsson et al (2018) used the O*NET database (https://www.onetcenter.org/da-
tabase.html), covering 964 occupations and 18,156 specific tasks at the occupation 
level, which are further mapped onto 2,069 direct work activities. They computed 
suitability for machine learning (SML) scores, ie the higher the score, the more 
likely that automation of the task through machine learning is technically feasible.
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This confirms that each occupation comprises a great variety of 
tasks, some of which are easier and some more difficult to automate. It 
is very rarely the case that the full range of tasks covered by an occu-
pation can be easily automated. This observation should make us 
cautious when we make predictions about the risks of automation at 
the occupational level. 
Frey and Osborne (2017) made occupational-level predictions for 
the US labour markets focusing on the displacement effect of new 
technologies and ignoring the associated positive productivity effects. 
In particular, they concluded that 47 percent of US occupations are at 
risk of automation in the next two decades. For the EU, Bowles (2014) 
found an even higher proportion – 54 percent – of EU occupations at 
risk. He concluded that the proportion of the EU work force that could 
be impacted significantly by advances in technology over the coming 
decades ranges from the mid-40 percent range (similar to the US) to 
well over 60 percent (Figure 3.8).
The importance of making predictions at the job-task level instead 
of occupational level was illustrated by Arntz et al (2017). They con-
cluded that the Frey and Osborne (2017) result (47 percent of US 
occupations are at risk of automation in the next two decades) falls to 
9 percent if predictions of the risk of automation are made with respect 
to tasks and not occupations. Aggregating the risk of automation at 
the level of occupations does not fully take into account the diversity 
of tasks each occupation comprises (with respect to the probability of 
automation).
Moreover, these studies focus on the feasibility automating different 
occupations/tasks. They ignore market developments, investment by 
firms and government interventions. They only provide a proxy for the 
displacement effect without estimating the associated productivity 
effects and the potential creation of new job tasks. A complete model 
would require taking a general equilibrium approach that takes into 
account other important factors that will affect the impact of automa-
tion on jobs. Unfortunately, such an equilibrium analysis has not been 
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done so far because AI and machine-learning technologies and their 
diffusion are quite recent and there is insufficient available data.
Figure 3.8: Risk of automation for occupations in EU countries
Source: Bruegel based on Frey and Osborne (2017).
Interestingly, Brynjolfsson et al (2018) concluded that the correla-
tion of the suitability of tasks for machine learning with wages for each 
task is very low. That might suggest that machine learning is a very dif-
ferent technology from earlier types of automation and affects a differ-
ent set of tasks. While the last waves of automation led to an increase 
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in job polarisation mostly explained by the routine-biased technologi-
cal change hypothesis (see chapter 2), it is not at the moment clear that 
machine learning will have the same effect. If AI systems can provide 
expert advice that is more valuable to medium or low-skilled work-
ers, it might benefit them relative to high-skilled workers and reduce 
the gap between them. However, it should not be overlooked that in 
contrast to earlier types of automation, such as industrial robots, AI 
targets more cognitive rather than physical tasks and can be viewed as 
a general purpose technology with a great variety of applications.
3.5 AI systems and creation of new jobs
As well as impacting current job tasks, AI systems have the potential to 
create new ones. A study by Accenture (2017) identified the categories 
of new jobs that will be created through the application of AI systems. 
For example, human workers will be needed to teach AI systems 
how they should perform. AI trainers will help natural-language pro-
cessors and translation systems make fewer errors, and they will teach 
AI algorithms to mimic human behaviour. For example, the conversa-
tional analysis tool Gong has created an algorithm that tries to teach 
AI systems when people are sarcastic and when they really mean what 
they say. In order to do that, it uses Twitter messages as the training 
data for its algorithm.
A second category of jobs involves unfolding the hidden or black 
box layers of AI systems (see section 3.2). While the input and output 
layers of a neural network structure can be readily observed, the same 
does not apply for the hidden layers via which the AI system processes 
the input variables to deliver the output. Sometimes, it is difficult even 
for the designers of the AI systems to know what exactly happens in 
the hidden layers of complex AI systems. Governments have already 
started to regulate in this area. For example, the EU’s general data 
protection regulation has created a ‘right to explanation’, allowing 
individuals to question and fight any decision that affects them that 
was made purely on an algorithmic basis. This will require explainers 
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who will be able to say why and how algorithms reached particular 
decisions. As Wilson et al (2017) explained: “Companies that deploy 
advanced AI systems will need employees who can explain the inner 
workings of complex algorithms to non-technical professionals. [...] For 
instance, if an expert recruiting system has identifi ed the best candidate 
for a research and development job, the employee could identify the var-
iables that led to that conclusion and explain why someone was hired or 
passed over for promotion [...] and explain why someone was hired or 
passed over for promotion.”
A third category of new jobs will help ensure that AI systems oper-
ate as designed and that unintended consequences are addressed. 
Wilson et al (2017) found that less than one-third of companies had 
a high degree of confidence in the fairness and auditability of their 
AI systems, and less than half had similar levels of confidence in the 
safety of those systems. New employees thus need to be hired who will 
act as arbiters to upholding norm of human values and morals. If, for 
example, an AI credit approval system were to discriminate against 
people in certain professions or specific geographical areas, the 
employees should intervene and correct that behaviour.
A common characteristic of these categories is that they all require 
advanced knowledge of how algorithms are designed and func-
tion. Jobs related to ICT and computer science are therefore further 
expected to flourish. This, of course, does not mean that new jobs in 
other sectors and disciplines will not be created. It is too early to assess 
broad categories of new jobs in other disciplines.
3.6 Further implications of AI systems
The applications of AI can be classified into two broad categories of job 
tasks (Ernst et al, 2018), each of which generate some concerns from 
the point of view of workers:
1. Matching tasks: tasks that involve the matching of supply and 
demand. Machines are becoming significantly faster and more 
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efficient in identifying matches in these markets. They are also 
becoming cheaper in their matching tasks, so that companies find 
it attractive to rely on such systems. A popular application of AI 
systems that perform matching tasks is in collaborative platforms. 
While machines augment revenue possibilities through the shar-
ing, renting or selling of individual’s underutilised assets, this might 
come at the cost of worsening working conditions for the suppliers 
of services, whether or not they are classified as employees. In 
chapter 4, we discuss the risks involved in platform work, especially 
in relation to social protection. 
 Moreover, as De Stefano (2018) points out, privacy protection 
might be inefficient when AI systems make real-time monitor-
ing of employees possible at low cost. More and more workers, 
for instance, use wearable work instruments that register their 
movements and location minute by minute, also measuring how 
fast they work and the breaks they take (Moore et al, 2018). These 
systems can also be used to check, for example, if these workers 
gather in specific locations, to prevent or react to collective action 
(De Stefano, 2016). 
2. Classification tasks: such tasks include, for example, medical ap-
plications (diagnosis based on X-rays), legal services (reading and 
classification of legal documents), accounting and auditing (anal-
ysis of balance sheets, fraud detection) and recruitment (screening 
applicants). In the case of platform work, bad scores or perfor-
mance below the algorithm’s standard can lead to the exclusion 
of the worker from the platform. Workers live in constant anxiety 
about ratings and how platforms’ algorithms take ratings into 
account when assigning the next job (FEPS, 2017). Such practices 
could also potentially lead to unfair discrimination. For example, 
companies might differentiate between categories of employees in 
terms of the working conditions, wages, benefits or responsibilities 
they offer. In such cases, discrimination raises the barriers to entry 
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to sensitive groups and minorities that find it necessary to accept 
lower wages or worse conditions in order to work and earn some 
revenue. Automated systems can replicate this bias (for example, 
consider access to loans, with African Americans reportedly facing 
higher barriers to access to the loan market). However, biases can 
occur when recruitment decisions are taken by humans. There is no 
empirical evidence that suggests AI systems are more biased than 
humans. 
The application of AI systems could also have an impact on young 
people entering the work force. Let us consider again the example of 
the lawyer who uses an AI system to assist him/her in the preparation 
of contracts and documents. Such assistance can help the lawyer focus 
and perform more efficiently the tasks that require human presence 
and interaction, and therefore are not easily automated. However, AI 
might provide the lawyer with less incentive to hire a recent gradu-
ate from a law school for the secondary tasks of organising files and 
documents if such tasks can be performed by an AI system. Or at least, 
the young adult that enters the labour force needs to have an adequate 
knowledge of how to interact with the AI system in the provision of 
such secondary tasks. AI systems might therefore create some chal-
lenges in terms of the education and training of young graduates and 
their integration into the labour force.
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4 The rise of the collaborative 
economy and new forms of 
work
In this chapter, we discuss the growth of the collaborative economy, 
provide working definitions of the terms that frame the debate on the 
future of work in an era of increasing digitalisation, and discuss the 
particular challenges that platform work and other flexible forms of 
work have raised.
4.1 Definitions and characteristics of the collaborative economy
Over the past few years, new business models have emerged in the 
economy, empowered by digital technologies. These have disrupted a 
range of activities, from food delivery and transportation to accommo-
dation and venture capital. Digital companies and their new business 
models collectively make up the platform economy. The diversity of 
lines of business and approaches makes it challenging, however, to 
study the platform economy as a general concept (see Petropoulos, 
2017, for a more extensive description).
The main participants in the collaborative economy are:
• Service providers who share assets, resources, time and/or skills. 
They can be either private individuals offering services on an occa-
sional basis (‘peers’) or professional service providers;
• Users who consume the assets provided;
• Intermediaries that connect providers with consumers via collabo-
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rative platforms, and which might also facilitate other transactions 
such as payments from consumers to providers.
Transactions in the collaborative economy do not generally lead to 
a change of ownership. By using information technologies, interme-
diaries can capture the underlying preferences and characteristics of 
potential providers and users and can match supply of and demand for 
assets in an efficient way. Intermediaries typically charge fees in the 
form of a percentage of the value of each transaction.
Use of technology to provide valuable information about the quality 
of products and services can be very beneficial for the economy. 
Akerlof (1970) showed how the quality of goods traded in a market 
can degrade or even lead to market failures if buyers and sellers do not 
have equal access to information.
Our concern here and throughout, however, is not on the trading of 
goods, but rather on the trading of labour. Because we focus on plat-
forms as labour markets, we exclude many well-known platforms such 
as eBay and AirBnB that deal primarily not with labour, but rather with 
the trading of goods and the renting of accommodation, respectively 
(Codagnone et al, 2016).
4.2 Definitions and characteristics of platform work and of social 
protection
Eurofound defines platform work as “an employment form in which 
organisations or individuals use an online platform to access other 
organisations or individuals to solve specific problems or to provide spe-
cific services in exchange for payment”19. The main features of platform 
work are:
19  European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. See 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dic-
tionary/platform-work.
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• Paid work is organised through online platforms;
• Three parties are involved: the online platform, the worker and the 
client;
• Work is contracted out;
• Jobs are broken down into tasks; and
• Services are provided on demand.
Platform work can be delivered either online or locally (in person). 
The most common tasks performed include:
• Professional tasks (for example, software development or graphic 
design);
• Transport (for example, personal transport or food delivery); 
• Household tasks (for example, cleaning); and
• Micro tasks (for example, tagging images on web pages)20.
The definition of non-traditional work is also important. The 
International Labour Organisation defines non-standard work as refer-
ring to “jobs that fall outside of the realm of standard work arrange-
ments, including temporary or fixed-term contracts, temporary agency 
or dispatched work, dependent self-employment, as well as part-time 
work, including marginal part-time work, which is characterised by 
short, variable, and often unpredictable hours” (ILO, 2016).
Note that we refer throughout to platform workers. Given the 
variety of their relationships with platforms, we take no position on 
whether these workers are more appropriately viewed as non-tradi-
tional workers or self-employed contractors under current law, a topic 
that is being actively debated in many jurisdictions (see chapter 5), 
and the answer to which would tend to be heavily dependent on spe-
cifics of a particular case. Our focus instead is on identifying the char-
acteristics that are relevant to determine the extent of social protection 
20 Ibid.
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platform workers should enjoy and the optimum policy goals, though 
noting that law might need to adapt to accommodate these emerging 
policy needs.
On social protection, the European Commission (2018b) describes 
social security (roughly synonymous with social protection) as follows: 
“Social security serves to protect people against the financial implica-
tions of social risks, such as ill health, old age or job loss, and contributes 
to preventing and alleviating poverty and social exclusion.” 
4.2.1 A classification of labour-intensive collaborative-economy platforms
Labour-intensive services are economic activities where most of the 
added value is generated by workers rather than by assets, machinery, 
buildings, knowledge, land or raw materials. For example, the inter-
net ride-sharing service Uber and the internet labour-sharing service 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT, https://www.mturk.com/) both rely 
heavily on the provision of labour by Uber drivers and AMT ‘Turkers’, 
respectively. While the cars and computers used to provide these ser-
vices are crucial, the labour of the worker is the essence of the service 
that is being sold.
Platforms change over time. It is possible that some platforms that 
function mainly as labour markets today might have little dependence 
on labour in the future. For example, if Uber rolls out an autonomous 
vehicle fleet as intended21, it might become progressively less depend-
ent on labour, and might evolve into a platform that primarily sells 
fully automated services. Likewise, the platforms facilitating outsourc-
ing of routine and cognitive tasks (such as AMT) might ultimately turn 
to automation. Machine-learning professionals have long used these 
platforms for labelling datasets (Sorokin and Forsyth, 2008), which 
can then be used to train algorithms that can then label any new data, 
21 Darrel Etherington (2018) ‘Uber CEO hopes to have self-driving cars in service in 18 
months’, TechCrunch, 23 January, available at https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/23/
uber-ceo-hopes-to-have-self-driving-cars-in-service-in-18-months/.
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effectively learning the exact task that was previously performed by 
platform workers and reducing or eliminating the labour intensity of 
the service provided.
Codagnone et al (2016) classified the wide spectrum of existing 
online platforms into two categories: online labour markets (OLMs) 
that provide the entire service electronically, and mobile labour mar-
kets (MLMs), where the delivery of the service is physical. Amazon 
Mechanical Turk services such as classification of photos or videos, or 
data cleansing, constitute an OLM inasmuch as no physical delivery 
is required. Uber services by contrast represent an MLM, since a car 
must physically appear at the requested location.
OLMs are potentially global, since the electronic services can 
potentially be delivered anywhere. MLMs are generally localised, 
because the services must be physically delivered.
Most MLMs are peer-to-peer, while most OLMs are 
peer-to-business.
Codagnone et al (2016) notes that there is a wide variation in the 
level of skill required between these two categories, and also within 
each category. Noteworthy examples include:
• OLMs for low-skill tasks, such as micro-tasking (eg object classifi-
cation, tagging, transcribing, marketing spam, data entry, content 
reviews, website feedback), which are traded takes via markets such 
as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Micro-tasking here refers to highly 
standardised, repetitive tasks that are paid for per piece. 
• OLMs for high-skill tasks, such as entirely self-contained creative 
projects (eg software development, engineering and data science, 
graphic design, clerical and secretarial work), in which are traded 
via platforms such as Upwork. 
• MLMs for low-skill tasks, such as local routine physical services (eg 
TaskRabbit, Uber). 
• MLMs for high-skill tasks, such as interactive services (eg 
TakeLessons).
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Another aspect is the degree of control platforms exercise over the 
conduct of work, which is a key element in determining whether work-
ers should be viewed as truly self-employed or as disguised employees. 
A four-quadrant classification would be based on the OLM/MLM split 
on the one hand, and on the degree of control on the other. This classi-
fication is similar to the one proposed by Forde et al (2017).
Box 1: The European Union Court of Justice ruling on the status of Uber
Launched in 2009, Uber Technologies Inc. (Uber) is a platform facilitating 
ridesharing and, more recently and to a lesser extent, food delivery. We 
focus on the ridesharing side of the business. Uber enables individuals 
(‘users’) to request a car with driver to drive them to an agreed location. This 
request is then forwarded by Uber to its network of drivers currently availa-
ble in the vicinity. Different types of ride cater to different needs: economy 
(uberX, uberXL, UberSELECT), premium (UberBLACK, UberSUV, UberLUX), 
wheelchairs and baby-friendly cars, and Carpool (uberPOOL) (Uber, 2018). 
Because it involves physical routine work, Codagnone et al (2016) classified 
Uber as a mobile labour market for low-skill tasks.
Importantly, it is Uber that charges the passenger and that makes the 
payment to the driver – the passenger does not pay the driver, as in a typical 
taxi. Depending on the city, Uber decides the fare either upfront or after the 
trip. When the fare is determined upfront, it depends on a base rate, a rate for 
estimated time and distance of the ride, and the demand for drivers in that 
area. Uber collects the fares from users. Once a week, it transfers the money 
made by the driver to his/her bank account. Uber also takes a service fee on 
every ride (Uber, 2018). Although Uber has not been transparent about the 
amount of this fee and how it is computed, some industry analysts have 
estimated that it has increased over the years and is now much higher than 
25 percent of the fares (Ridester, 2018).  
The EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in 2017 ruled that Uber should be classi-
fied and regulated as a transport service rather than as an online information 
society service. The CJEU did not specifically rule on the status of Uber 
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drivers (see C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems 
Spain, SL, CJEU, 20 December 2017). 
• Independent supply of the services: By pooling drivers and users, Uber 
ensures a reliable supply and demand for the service, which makes it worth-
while for both sides of the market to remain in the market. An individual driv-
er, outside the platform, could not generate an equivalently reliable market. 
There is therefore no independent supply of the services. 
• Influence over the conditions under which the drivers provide their service: 
A key factor in the CJEU ruling was the control that Uber exercises over its 
drivers, as demonstrated by performance standards, monitoring of execu-
tion, controlling production and assets, implementing schedules and setting 
the price of the service. Uber does not directly establish strict performance 
standards for its drivers, but it forces them to comply with local applicable 
regulations. Additionally, Uber maintains a mechanism for rating of drivers 
by users and, more controversially, vice versa. Importantly, Uber forwards 
ridesharing requests to drivers depending on drivers’ ratings, giving priority 
to the highest rated-drivers. This effectively enforces a user feedback-based 
competitive performance standard. Uber also has the right to monitor its driv-
ers and users through its app, and evidence was provided to the CJEU that it 
leverages this power to detect pickier drivers (Codagnone et al, 2016). While 
Uber has no control over drivers’ cars, it does require drivers to follow local 
regulations in terms of vehicle standards for chauffeur services. Uber has 
also notoriously leveraged its variable fares to effectively enforce schedules 
for drivers, favouring drivers working at unsocial hours. Finally, Uber sets 
the price of its service. The CJEU consequently concluded that Uber exerts a 
“decisive influence” over the service provided.
Sources: Owen Bowcott, ‘Uber to face stricter EU regulation after ECJ rules it is 
transport firm’, The Guardian, 20 December 2017, available at 17 May 2018 
from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/dec/20/uber-euro-
pean-court-of-justice-ruling-barcelona-taxi-drivers-ecj-eu; CJEU, C-434/15, 
Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain, SL, 20 December 2017.
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In any future rulings on the social protection rights of Uber drivers, other 
factors might be taken to account, such as:
• Financial dependence: To what extent are the drivers dependent on the Uber 
platform? There is likely to be substantial variability in how dependent on the 
platform Uber drivers are for their livelihoods. 
• Profit motive: One might make the argument that drivers are not seeking 
profits.
4.2.2 The relationship between platform work and other forms of employment
We also need to consider how platform work relates to other forms of 
employment. Figure 4.1 shows the model used by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO).
The ILO makes a distinction between standard employment and 
non-standard employment. Standard employment includes employ-
ment relationships satisfying four criteria: they are i) embodied by an 
employer-employee link, ii) open-ended and continuous (ie of indefi-
nite duration), iii) full time, and iv) subordinate and direct.
Non-standard employment is defined as constituting forms of 
employment that do not satisfy at least one of these criteria (ILO, 
2016). Non-standard employment therefore includes several forms of 
employment. Temporary employment is non-standard employment 
because it is not open-ended. Part-time and on-call work are likewise 
non-standard as they are not full-time. Multiparty employment, where 
a worker relies on a temporary agency or is a subcontractor to a party 
other than the end user of the labour, is also a non-standard form of 
employment because it is not direct with the end user and is not sub-
ordinate to the end user of the labour
Relationships in which the worker depends economically on 
a single client or a small number of clients, but where there is no 
employer-employee relationship, can be referred to as disguised 
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employment or dependent self-employment (ILO, 2016; Cherry and 
Aloisi, 2018).
Figure 4.1: Classification of employment relationships
Source: Bruegel, based on ILO (2016).
Platform work is not a standard form of employment. It is not 
embodied by an employer-employee relationship, is not open-ended 
or continuous, is not necessarily full-time and is not necessarily char-
acterised by direct subordination to the employer. Some experts have 
argued that many platform workers should not be considered self-em-
ployed, but rather to be dependent self-employed (Cherry and Aloisi, 
2018; ILO, 2018a; Forde et al, 2017; Codagnone et al, 2016). Dependent 
self-employment (Figure 4.1) is more likely to be found in cases of high 
platform control. 
4.2.3 Sectors in which platform work is becoming prominent
The four sectors in which collaborative economy platforms have the 
most significant presence are:
• Accommodation: via platforms, people rent out properties or 
parts of properties. Examples of such companies include Airbnb, 
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HomeAway, HouseTrip, 9Flats, Wimdu, Onefinestay, Roomerama, 
Sleepout, Love Home Swap and Holiday Lettings. Airbnb provides 
a residential space rental platform that matches hosts and guests. 
Airbnb has achieved impressive scale in just a few years, offering 
more than five million lodging options across 191 countries. At its 
last financing, at time of writing, in 2017, Airbnb was valued at $31 
billion22.
• Transportation: Two different broad categories of platform can be 
distinguished in this sector. The first group of platforms facilitates 
the hiring of assets such as cars, motorbikes and bicycles. Examples 
are ZipCar, EasyCar, car2go, Autolib and Velib. The second group of 
platforms helps users rent assets together with labour and human 
capital. Examples include Uber, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, Car2go and Side-
car. Car2go offers transportation on demand using ‘by-the-minute’ 
rates. BlaBlaCar enables drivers with empty seats and paying pas-
sengers to share long-distance travel costs. Uber matches drivers 
with individuals who need a lift; in addition, it has branched out 
into food delivery, freight delivery, and more complex forms of ride 
hailing such as carpooling. It had 3.9 million drivers in the fourth 
quarter of 2018, and covered 63 countries and more than 700 cities 
worldwide. It generated $9.2 billion in revenue from its ride-hailing 
products in 2018. It is said to be hoping for a valuation in the $90 to 
120 billion range in an expected initial public offering (IPO) later in 
2019. Meanwhile, Uber’s competitor Lyft is more narrowly focused 
on transportation in the US and Canada, and has set a price range 
for its impending IPO that would value the company at about $20 
22 Forbes (2018) ‘As A Rare Profitable Unicorn, Airbnb Appears To Be Worth At Least 
$38 Billion’, 11 May, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspecula-
tions/2018/05/11/as-a-rare-profitable-unicorn-airbnb-appears-to-be-worth-at-
least-38-billion/#2998e01a2741.
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billion23.
• Online labour markets: Examples include Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (AMT), Adtriboo, TaskRabbit, Oltretata, Freelancer, Crowd-
source, Crowdflower and Clickworker. These platforms specialise in 
micro-tasking. They match employers with on-demand workers. 
• Finance: Crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and In-
dieGogo match entrepreneurial projects with funders (venture 
capital financing). Peer-to-peer lending platforms such as Lending 
Club and Prosper connect individuals and SMEs with potential 
peer-lenders, without the involvement of any financial institution.
Eurofound (2018) identified 10 types of platform work that could be 
said to have reached critical mass in Europe in terms of the number of 
platforms and affiliated workers, differentiated primarily by the scale 
of tasks, the format of service provision (whether the tasks are deliv-
ered locally or online), the level of skills required, the process by which 
clients are matched to workers (offer of work versus competition) and 
the party that determines the work allocation. Eurofound identified:
• Local client-determined routine work (for example, when a client 
orders shipping services through Shiply);
• Local platform-determined routine work (for example, when a 
platform like Foodora determines which bike courier will deliver a 
meal);
• Local client-determined moderately-skilled work (for example, 
when a client contacts a worker through Stootie to assemble their 
furniture);
• Local worker-initiated moderately-skilled work (for example, when a 
worker contacts a potential client through Listminut to cut their lawn);
23 Lora Kolodny (2019) ‘Uber is way more complicated than Lyft, and investors 
shouldn’t value them the same way’, CNBC, 13 April, available at https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/04/13/uber-is-way-more-complicated-than-lyft-and-investors-shouldnt-
value-them-the-same-way.html.
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• Local client-determined expert (for example, when a client selects 
a worker through Appjobber to take pictures of a product in a local 
store);
• Local platform-determined expert  (for example, when the platform 
BeMyEyes selects a worker to (remotely) assist a visually impaired 
person);
• Online moderately-skilled click-work (for example, when a worker 
tags images on Figure Eight);
• Online platform-determined expert (for example, when a platform 
like TestBirds sources software-testing tasks to a select group of 
workers);
• Online client-determined specialist (for example, when clients ad-
vertise and select a worker on Freelancer for business assistance); 
and
• Online contestant specialist (for example, when a large brand se-
lects one or several winners in a design competition on 99Designs).
4.3 Platform work in the context of the evolution of EU labour 
markets
Platform work may be novel, but it is best understood as a continua-
tion of the ongoing evolution of EU labour markets.
4.3.1 The evolution of European labour markets
Platform work is only one of the many new forms of work that have 
emerged in Europe in recent years. Eurofound has identified at least 
nine new forms of labour: (1) collaborative employment; (2) employee 
sharing; (3) portfolio work; (4) interim management; (5) platform 
work; (6) ICT based mobile work; (7) job sharing; (8) voucher-based 
work; and (9) casual work (2019).
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4.3.2 Platform work as an aspect of labour flexibility
There is a temptation to think of the new forms of work as an alto-
gether new phenomenon, but platform work is better understood as a 
further evolution of a move towards labour flexibility that was already 
clearly visible at least thirty years ago (as explained by Atkinson, 1984, 
and Atkinson and Meander, 1986, which we follow closely here).
Earlier generations might have hoped to have been employed by 
a single, large corporation for their entire working lives. By the 1980s, 
this dream had substantially eroded, especially in countries such as 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Many firms restructured 
their operations to make increasing use of part-time employees, tem-
porary agency staff and contractors, gaining significant new flexibility 
by doing so. Atkinson and Meander (1986) identified three key reasons 
for firms to favour flexibility:
• Productivity gains: Firms looked to improve productivity, and to 
cut unit labour costs;
• Market volatility and uncertainty: firms sought to adapt their 
staffing practices to better adjust to larger and increasingly unpre-
dictable market fluctuations;
• Technological change: firms felt the need for new staffing practic-
es to accommodate new technology and to enable them to quickly 
introduce practices appropriate for future technology.
What kinds of flexibility do firms need to achieve these goals? 
The literature (see Atkinson, 1984) identified three distinct forms of 
flexibility:
• Functional flexibility: this enables employees to be quickly and 
smoothly redeployed between activities and tasks;
• Numerical flexibility: this is the ability to rapidly ratchet up and 
down the number of hours worked to match demand;
• Financial flexibility: this is the ability to rapidly adjust the cost of 
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pay and benefits to reflect the state of supply and demand in the 
external labour market.
This flexibility was (and continues to be) important for the EU, and 
represents a necessary complement in terms of labour to the single 
market for goods. Sapir (2006) argued that without “… the liberalisation 
of labour markets … and greater labour mobility within and across 
companies, the liberalisation of product markets [is] unlikely to trigger 
the reallocation of resources necessary to produce higher growth.”
A distinction can be made between primary labour markets 
and secondary labour markets. The former are for employees with 
firm-specific skills that the firm seeks first to build (through training 
and development) and then to retain (through attractive terms and 
conditions, fringe benefits and promotion opportunities). These mar-
kets are largely internal to the firm.
Secondary labour markets are for those with general, transferable 
skills or no skills at all. Since these workers are fungible, the firm has 
little incentive to train or retain them. In contrast to primary employ-
ees, secondary labour market conditions are broadly tied to the exter-
nal labour market (Atkinson, 1984).
The evolution of the 1980s (see again Atkinson, 1984) led to the 
emergence of four main categories of worker:
• A core group of full-time employees, such as managers, designers, 
technical sales staff, quality control staff, technicians and skilled 
craftsmen;
• A first peripheral group of full-time employees, but with more limit-
ed job security and career opportunities;
• A second peripheral group under more flexible contractual ar-
rangements, such as part-time workers (twilight shifts, overlaid 
shifts, peak manning), job sharers, temporary contractors or public 
subsidy trainees.
• An external group, where jobs are not firm-specific at all, either 
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because they are highly specialised or because they are routine and 
low skill. These functions might be contracted out or handled by 
temporary help agencies.
For the core group, with firm-specific skills that are not readily 
available in the outside labour market, training and retention are 
important. This is less the case for the peripheral groups, and is not 
important for the external group (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Evolution of firms to achieve labour flexibility
Group Basis for pay Skills Training and 
retention
Job 
security
Core group Performance High, firm-
specific
Important High
First peripheral Hours worked Moderate Less important Moderate
Second peripheral Hours worked? Low Unimportant Low
External Tasks done? High or low, but 
not firm-specific
Unimportant Nil
Source: Bruegel based on Atkinson (1984).
How does this relate to collaborative economy work? It is fairly 
clear that a driver for Uber or Lyft performs a rather low-skill job that 
requires only limited firm-specific skills and minimal training. In fact, 
the skills are so general and limited that we can reasonably expect 
their jobs to fall victim to automation once self-driving cars are suffi-
ciently reliable. Whether their work is more akin to that of the second 
peripheral group (ie employees under flexible contracts) or the exter-
nal group (independent contractors) is precisely the question that has 
occupied courts and regulators in various countries and municipalities 
in recent years (see chapter 5).
Platform work is, however, very diverse. The micro-tasking under-
taken via Amazon Mechanical Turk (see section 4.2.3) does not require 
any firm-specific skills, and thus fits more easily into the external 
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group of the Atkinson (1984) model. Those highly-skilled workers 
who provide work through profession-specific platforms that rely on 
freelancers, project managers and other professionals24 could be better 
likened to the first peripheral group.
It is important to note that the literature on labour flexibility places 
its focus on benefits to the firm. The impact on employees is consid-
ered to only a limited extent, but it was generally expected for second-
ary employees (in peripheral and external groups) that “conditions 
of employment seem likely to deteriorate substantially – payments for 
non-worked time (holidays, sickness and pension) are likely to be most 
badly affected” (Atkinson, 1984).
It is also worth noting that the technology embodied in these new 
collaborative-economy firms could potentially offer flexibility not 
only to firms but also to workers. Where labour flexibility historically 
pushed many workers outside of prime shifts, platform workers might 
have the option (within limits) to work the hours they choose to work. 
This is clearly the case for many of the most prominent platforms, 
including Amazon Mechanical Turk and, to some extent, Uber (section 
4.2.3).
4.4 Empirical evidence on the extent of the collaborative economy 
and platform work in the EU
Describing the platform economy and platform work in the EU has 
proved challenging for researchers (Pesole et al, 2018; Forde et al, 2017; 
Codagnone et al, 2016). Even figuring out the size of such a novel and 
decentralised industry has been difficult, and estimates for the EU vary 
widely. Beyond broad aggregate figures, there are also significant dif-
ferences in estimates of many aspects of platform work, ranging from 
the age of participants to the type of work carried out via platforms.
24 Consider for example the Upwork platform. See https://www.upwork.com/i/how-it-
works/client/.
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Box 2: Challenges in measuring the collaborative economy
The collaborative economy is a new phenomenon. Many of the tools and 
techniques experts use to measure economic activity do a poor job when 
applied to the collaborative economy.
To begin with, the definitions of different forms of economic activity 
embodied in the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community (or NACE based on its acronym in French) do not 
cleanly map onto the many emerging collaborative economy activities. 
National statistical agencies in Europe are consequently not currently set up 
to track collaborative economy activities.
Second, who are the providers of services? It is difficult and potentially 
burdensome to capture small scale, non-professional providers of services.
Third, even though platforms generally have information about their 
service suppliers, EU data protection rules might limit the ability of ser-
vice providers to provide information about their suppliers to independent 
researchers. Or perhaps platforms use privacy obligations to justify refusals 
to provide data that they do not wish to provide – it is hard to judge.
Fourth, administrative data (such as income declarations) will often 
be known to public authorities, but there is no systematic reporting of the 
collaborative economy as such and public authorities are typically not per-
mitted to make this data available to independent researchers.
Web scraping can be used to capture some of this data, but the choice of 
data to be scraped tends to differ from one collaborative economy platform 
to the next. Obtaining an integrated and coherent picture of the collaborative 
economy can be labour-intensive, if it can be done at all. 
In the longer term, it seems clear that it will be necessary to identify the 
data that policymakers truly need, and to have national statistical agencies 
collect it systematically. Unfortunately, we are a long way from that point.  
Since data obtained via web-scraping techniques will tend to focus only on 
specific aspects of the operation of these platforms, and in light of the limita-
tions likely to be found in the data obtained, it is challenging to derive broad 
policy lessons from web-scraped data.
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4.4.1 Size and scope of the collaborative economy in the EU and the United States
Despite the limitations noted in Box 2 some useful survey data is avail-
able for the United States, and somewhat less for the EU.
According to a 2015 survey of 3,000 Americans (Burson-Marsteller 
et al, 2015), 44 percent of the population have used collaborative plat-
forms. Corrected for internet usage and demographics, the data shows 
that almost all of the people involved in the collaborative economy 
have used the services (42 percent) of a collaborative platform and 
about half have worked (22 percent) through a collaborative platform. 
Figure 4.2: Share of the US population share that participates in collaborative 
economy (2015)
Source: Burson-Marsteller et al (2015).
Figure 4.2 shows the share of the US population that participates 
in the collaborative economy. Providers primarily offer services such 
as home repair and moving (11 percent), ride sharing (10 percent), 
accommodation (9 percent) and, to a lesser extent, food delivery (7 
percent) and car rental/sharing (6 percent). The services provided are 
quite evenly spread across the different types of service identified in 
Burson-Marsteller et al (2015). Demand meanwhile is more biased 
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towards ride sharing, accommodation (19 percent) and services (17 
percent). Providers and users have, on average, offered or used ser-
vices from two types of platform.
Recognising the need for better data on the size and scope of the 
collaborative economy in Europe, the Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) initiated the COLLaborative Economy and Employment 
(COLLEEM) survey in 2017. Based on the data developed by the 
COLLEEM survey, Pesole et al (2018) found that 11.9 percent of inter-
net users between 16 and 74 years old in 14 EU countries25 have earned 
income at least once by providing services via online platforms. When 
adjusting for internet usage, this figure corresponds to 9.7 percent of 
the total population between 16 and 74, or around 37 million people. 
In terms of frequency, they found that 7.7 percent of the population 
between 16 and 74 worked via platforms at least once a month, and 5.6 
percent regularly worked via platforms for ten or more hours per week. 
However, Forde et al (2017) concluded based on surveys and literature 
that between 1 percent and 5 percent of the adult population of the 
EU has provided paid services through the platform economy at least 
once, far lower than the Pesole et al (2018) figure of 9.7 percent.
Platform work is more prevalent in some EU countries than others, 
but the reasons are not immediately evident. In the UK, 11 percent of 
the working age population has worked at least once via platforms, 
while in Sweden, 12 percent of the working age population has worked 
at least once via platforms (Codagnone et al, 2016). In a survey of 
2,000 working-age adults carried out between January 2016 and April 
2017, Huws et al (2018) found that the proportion of respondents 
reporting doing some platform work was 9 percent in the UK and the 
Netherlands, 10 percent in Sweden, 12 percent in Germany, 18 percent 
in Switzerland, 19 percent in Austria and 22 percent in Italy.
25 Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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4.4.2 To what extent do workers depend on platform work?
Figure 4.3 shows the share of household income derived from the col-
laborative economy for US families that are active in the collaborative 
economy: 39 percent of these households earn less than 25 percent of 
their income from the collaborative economy, while 29 percent rely 
heavily on income earned via collaborative economy platforms. 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of household income derived from the collaborative 
economy, US families, 2015
Source: RFS 1099 Report, Bloomberg.
Pesole et al (2018) provided a similar detailed breakdown of how 
much of the income of platform workers in the EU comes from plat-
form work based on data from the previously mentioned COLLEEM 
survey. The survey did not distinguish between personal income and 
family income.
From their own survey, Forde et al (2017) found that a quarter of 
platform workers depended on platform work for at least 70 percent of 
their income26. While this estimate is much higher than that in Pesole 
26 Their survey covered 1200 platform workers using Amazon Mechanical Turks, 
Clickworker, Crowdflower and Microworkers (Forde et al, 2017).
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et al (2018), the magnitude suggests that there is a significant minority 
of platform workers who are dependent on platform work for most of 
their income.
Figure 4.4: Percentage of income derived from platform work, EU families, 2017
Source: Bruegel based on Pesole et al (2018).
On the other hand, Huws et al (2018) reported that platform work 
contributed a much smaller proportion of total income for most 
respondents to their survey. It contributed more than half of all per-
sonal income for only 2.3 percent of the total sample in Austria, 3.5 
percent in Switzerland, 2.5 percent in Germany, 5.1 percent in Italy, 
1.6 percent in the Netherlands and 2.7 percent in Sweden and the UK 
– forming the main source of income for an average of 2.9 percent of 
respondents in the seven countries of their sample.
In assessing reliance on platform income, Pesole et al (2018) 
considered income earned by platform workers from platform work 
and from wages, and also income from other sources such as rent 
and capital gains. Their analysis offers two insights. First, they found 
that individuals in the lowest income decile are overrepresented 
among platform workers, representing 26 percent of platform workers 
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(compared to the 10 percent benchmark that would be expected if all 
deciles were equally likely to participate in platform work). Second, 
there appears to be a slight polarisation in the income distribution of 
platform workers, particularly for those workers who rely most on plat-
forms. As well as the overrepresentation of individuals from the lowest 
income decile among platform workers, individuals from the highest 
income decile are also overrepresented among platform workers. This 
is associated with a systematic underrepresentation among platform 
workers of individuals with an income between the 25th and 75th per-
centile (Pesole et al, 2018), as shown in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of platform workers per income decile
Source: Bruegel, based on Pesole et al (2018). Note: ‘Total’ refers to the entire sample 
of platform workers. ‘Main PW’ refers to platform workers who earn >50 percent of 
income from and/or spend 20 hours per week on platform work. ‘Significant but not 
main’ refers to platform workers who earn between 25 percent and 50 percent of their 
income from and/or spend 10 to 20 hours per week on platform work. ‘Not signif’ 
refers to platform workers who earn less than 25 percent of their income from and 
spend less than 10 hours per week on platform work, but have worked at least once on 
platforms. Finally, ‘Benchmark’ is the theoretical distribution representative of society 
as a whole.
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In order to understand whether platform workers should be 
thought of as employees versus self-employed, it is interesting to 
consideration the perceptions of platform workers themselves. In the 
EU, 38.1 percent of platform workers who rely on platforms for most 
of their income, or who regularly work 20 hours or more per week 
via platforms, regard themselves as employees and do not consider 
themselves to be self-employed (Pesole et al, 2018). In other words, 
many dependent platform workers consider themselves to be de-facto 
employees even though they have a self-employment contract.
Figure 4.6: Reasons for joining collaborative economy platforms (US, 2015)
Source: Burson-Marsteller et al (2015).
Figure 4.6 shows that the 36 percent of those platform workers who 
earn less than 40 percent of their monthly income in the collaborative 
economy (ie those who are least dependent on the collaborative econ-
omy, referred to by Burson-Marsteller et al (2015) as ‘casual workers’) 
participate in the collaborative economy in order to add to their income. 
Smaller percentages of these workers are attracted primarily because of 
the flexibility of work in collaborative economy business models.
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The same data also indicates that the 33 percent of workers who 
earn more than 40 percent of their monthly income in the collabora-
tive economy (ie those who have greater dependency on the collabora-
tive economy, referred to by Burson-Marsteller et al (2015) as ‘moti-
vated workers’) consider the collaborative economy to be the primary 
source of their income, the same percentage as those who work in the 
collaborative economy because they could not find work in the offline 
economy. A nearly equal share work in the collaborative economy 
because they value the independence or flexibility that it provides.
4.4.3 Who are the platform workers?
The demographic composition of the collaborative economy workforce 
is also important to understand because it is a factor in determining 
social protection needs. The typical platform worker is younger than 
other workers, with median age of 34 compared to 44 for other work-
ers. Nevertheless, there is also a significant minority of older individ-
uals and retired people employed in the platform economy (Pesole 
et al, 2018; Forde et al, 2017; Codagnone et al, 2016). Among platform 
workers, the younger the worker, the more likely the worker is to rely 
on platform work as a source of income (Pesole et al, 2018).
Gender also plays a role, reinforcing the conclusions of Forde et al 
(2017). Males are more likely than females to perform platform work. 
Women constitute 47.5 percent of non-platform workers in the EU, 
40.2 percent of workers using platforms only occasionally, 31.2 percent 
of workers who use platforms frequently but not as their main job, and 
26.3 percent of workers who rely on platforms as their main job27.
In terms of education, of the population between 25 and 75 years 
27 Pesole et al (2018) defined these categories of platform workers more rigorously: i) 
not significant platform work (<25 percent of income derived from platform work 
and <10 hours of platform work per week, but have worked at least once on plat-
forms); ii) significant but not mainly platform work (>25 percent and <50 percent of 
income and/or 10 to 20 hours of platform work per week); iii) mainly platform work 
(>50 percent of income and/or 20 hours of platform work per week).
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old, Pesole et al (2018) found that the share of platform workers with 
tertiary education was consistently above 50 percent, regardless of the 
intensity of their usage or their reliance on platforms. This is in striking 
contrast to the share of non-platform workers with tertiary education, 
which is 36.2 percent. These results are similar to the results of the 
survey done by Forde et al (2017), and to the review of the available 
evidence in Codagnone et al (2016).
Platform jobs span a wide range of human capital needed, although 
once again there are significant difficulties in assessing the relative 
importance of each type of service (Pesole et al, 2018; Codagnone et 
al, 2016). Pesole et al (2018) found that the most prevalent type of task 
was online clerical and data entry, involved in 43 percent of platform 
jobs. These tasks are typically considered as routine and requiring less 
skill. This finding is in line with Forde et al (2017). However, the second 
and third most prevalent types were professionals and creative tasks, 
which 30 percent of platform jobs involved (note that the categories 
are not mutually exclusive – an individual might have performed more 
than one kind of platform work). These tasks are typically considered 
less routine and requiring of greater skills (Pesole et al, 2018). 
4.4.4 Working conditions and the sense of well-being of platform workers
The working conditions of platform workers are diverse. Most workers 
who rely on platforms as their main source of income, or who depend on 
platforms as a significant complement to their income, report that their 
platform work is often stressful and routine (Pesole et al, 2018). Platform 
workers work very few hours compared to traditional workers; 28.5 per-
cent work fewer than 10 hours a week via the platform or on other jobs. 
More than half work fewer than 30 hours per week, on the platform or on 
another job. Only 14.7 percent of platform workers work a full 40-hour 
week either on platform work or non-platform jobs. At the other end of 
the spectrum, 7 percent of platform workers work more than 60 hours 
per week, on platform work or other jobs (Pesole et al, 2018).
The survey of platform workers in Forde et al (2017) also sheds 
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some light on their wellbeing, highlighting the prevalence of unscru-
pulous platform users (paying less than promised, delaying pay, 
communicating aggressively or systematically underestimating the 
time required for tasks). While platform workers valued flexibility, they 
viewed negatively the pay levels, job security, career prospects and 
routineness of tasks. This resulted in mixed overall satisfaction levels 
among platform workers. Note however that there is substantial varia-
bility of results depending on the platform and type of task.
4.5 Challenges for platform work 
The key concern with platform work is that it offers forms of employ-
ment without standard contracts and leaves workers “without suffi-
cient access to social protection due to their labour market status or the 
type of employment relationship” (European Commission, 2018a). 
The emergence of platform workers can be viewed as a growing 
aspect of a broader challenge. Platform work can be viewed as an 
aspect of labour flexibility (section 4.3.2). Non-traditional, flexible 
forms of labour have been expanding at least since the 1980s, largely 
as a means of enabling firms to cope with uncertain demand and with 
technological change.
Surveys and studies show that platform workers face many chal-
lenges, not only in terms of social protection, but also in terms of their 
overall earnings:
• Low wages: Wages earned via platforms are very low, with just a 
few segments of workers able to earn above middle level income 
(Codagnone et al, 2016). The average pay levels for the four plat-
forms surveyed by Forde et al (2017) were significantly below min-
imum wage in European countries, with a gap of up to 54.1 percent 
between platform wages and the national minimum wage in the 
case of France.
• Limited ability to save or to invest in pensions: the low earnings, 
together with statutory limitations, mean platform workers save 
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very little for pensions (Forde et al, 2017).
• Limited access to social protection schemes: platform workers are 
partly or fully excluded from many forms of social protection (see 
chapter 5.2). The majority of platform workers surveyed had no 
access to social protection schemes in relation to disability, old age, 
pregnancy, care or unemployment (Codagnone et al, 2016; Forde et 
al, 2017). 
• Limitations on collective bargaining rights: to the extent that they 
are considered to be self-employed, platform workers typically lack 
the right to bargain collectively (Forde et al, 2017; Riley, 2017).
• Intrusions on other rights: platform workers are also more vulner-
able to violation of privacy and to discrimination (Codagnone et al, 
2016).
At the same time, the flexibility that these new forms of work 
embody can provide benefits to the firms that organise them and 
to those who perform the work. In many cases, workers who might 
otherwise be unemployed or underemployed have a new source of 
income. Workers might benefit from greater choice over the hours that 
they work. Any policies on platform work should therefore be carefully 
targeted so they do not needlessly undermine these potential and 
actual benefits.
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5 Social protection in the EU 
today
In this chapter, we provide a broad overview of social protection poli-
cies in the European Union and discuss why non-traditional workers 
(including the self-employed) are often excluded from effective social 
protection, taking into account the lack of statutory coverage and 
practical impediments. The classification of platform workers plays an 
enormous role in their entitlement to social protection under current 
law and is an illustration of the broader problems that can be expected 
as non-traditional forms of work continue to proliferate. We discuss 
efforts to broaden the approach to social protection in light of the 
growing diversity and complexity of forms of work, and reflect on the 
development of skills and the need for lifelong learning, which must 
surely represent a key element in any coherent policy response to the 
changes in the world or work. 
5.1 Social protection in the EU
5.1.1 The economic rationale for social protection
Social protection is largely about the redistribution of resources, and 
secondarily about facilitating intertemporal transfers of resources, 
such as through pensions. The proper role for public policy is debated, 
but it is generally accepted that government has a role to play. The 
French economist Thomas Piketty argues that the state should seek to 
counter inequality that arises from factors beyond the control of indi-
viduals (Piketty, 2015). This is often expressed in terms of the Rawlsian 
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philosophical maximin principle, “according to which a just society 
should seek to maximise the minimum opportunities within the social 
system” (Rawls, 1985).
Within this broader framework, the numerous individual 
instruments that comprise the core of the modern welfare state 
have emerged for a range of interrelated reasons (Piketty, 2015). 
Unemployment insurance for instance has never been provided by 
private insurers, despite the obvious benefits to those who would have 
been insured, largely because of the challenges inherent in informa-
tion asymmetries between potential insurance firms and insured indi-
viduals. The individual knows how much he or she earns, but would 
not be motivated to report it correctly to a private firm. The individual 
will also tend to know much more about the risk of losing his or her job 
than would a private insurer. Governments are better positioned than 
private firms to address the information asymmetries and to carry the 
risks.
Information asymmetries likewise exist for health insurance. In the 
absence of some form of regulation, healthy individuals might effec-
tively choose to self-insure, thus leaving private insurers with a pool 
of high-cost individuals. Conversely, since the insured individual has 
limited influence or ability to judge the underlying costs, private insur-
ance can lead to high prices and unnecessary procedures.
On pensions, there are several arguments for a government role 
(Piketty, 2015). Markets might be inefficient in achieving the inter-
temporal transfers needed; low-income individuals might not have 
access to efficient investment instruments for achieving the necessary 
intertemporal transfers; and individuals might under-invest, prioritis-
ing short-term over long-term needs.
5.1.2 Who pays and who benefits?
The question of who pays for benefits, and how, is clearly important in 
this discussion. Notably, should the cost be borne by the government, 
the firm or the individual?
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The shift from traditional full-time employment to various non-tra-
ditional forms of work, and to self-employment, exacerbates funding 
challenges. Governments are well equipped to collect payments when 
an employee is paid. Collecting from the self-employed is more dif-
ficult, verification of income is challenging and the risk of systematic 
underpayment is far greater. Furthermore these challenges to funding 
come at a time when the work force is expected to decline because of 
demographic changes and the share of gross value added achieved by 
labour is likewise in decline.
How, then, can funding best be secured? One might reasonably 
expect that fiscal redistribution, with funding coming from neutral tax-
ation on profits for instance, should generally be preferred over direct 
redistribution. If firms are required to contribute to social protection 
based, for instance, on the number of workers they employ, this will 
tend to increase their perceived cost of labour and will lead them to 
employ fewer workers (Piketty, 2015). The cost of employee benefits 
is effectively a part of the payments that the firm makes to the worker. 
The argument is thus that the increased cost to the firm will tend to be 
reflected in the price of the goods or services, which will tend to reduce 
consumption because of the price elasticity of demand, or else will 
shift usage in the direction of less-expensive substitutes or alternatives.
In practice, however, many additional factors come into play. The 
increase in benefits could be expected to stimulate an increase in the 
number of people willing to do the work. The risk of price increases 
might be contained by the risk or reality of competitive entry, or by the 
price of imported goods or services. The degree to which the increased 
cost to firms leads to less employment in practice is thus debatable.
This question is closely linked to the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labour. If the effective price of labour goes up, 
to what extent will firms substitute capital (eg investment in more or 
better equipment) for labour?
In speaking of social welfare systems, a distinction is sometimes 
made between insurance-like models similar to those introduced in 
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Germany in the late nineteenth century, and those like the United 
Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS), which is available to all. The 
former is referred to as Bismarck’s model (named after the Germany’s 
Iron Chancellor), the latter as Beveridge’s model (after the designer 
of the UK’s NHS). By the time that Bismarck left office in 1890, the 
programme he had launched already included not only health insur-
ance, but also accident insurance, disability insurance and an old-age 
retirement pension.
These models differ in terms of who pays for the benefits and who 
is qualified to receive the benefits. In Bismarck’s model, benefits are 
available only to the families of those who work, and are paid for by 
employees. In Beveridge’s model, they are typically available to all, and 
are funded out of general taxation revenues.
Table 5.1: Different approaches to health care: Bismarck versus Beveridge
Bismarck Beveridge
Payments Employers and employees General government revenue
Beneficiaries Employees and their families All citizens
Source: Bruegel based on Kutzin (2011).
For many benefits, there is an argument to be made that they are 
important for all, not just for the families of those who work. It might 
also be the case that those who are not covered would have to be cared 
for in any case, possibly through public-assistance mechanisms that 
are less well tailored to the specific needs in question. For this reason, 
there has been a global move away from pure Bismarckian systems 
(Kutzin, 2011).
Health systems with Bismarckian characteristics in the EU have 
been under pressure in recent years because of (1) demographic 
change that shrinks the number of contributing workers as the popu-
lation ages; and (2) reduction in consumption of health-care services 
during the years of economic crisis, again potentially undermining the 
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base of economic support (Kutzin, 2011).
As already noted, funding mechanisms should generally be pre-
ferred that do not impose increased costs per worker on firms (ie fiscal 
rather than direct mechanisms). This is not a question of the level of 
funding, but rather reflects the need to avoid depressing the number of 
workers.
Bismarckian systems may oblige the participation of all employees. 
If participation was purely voluntary, the system might attract only 
individuals who know that they are unhealthy. This would tend to 
necessitate unacceptably high premiums.
Bismarck-type solutions are arguably easier to ‘sell’ to the elector-
ate. They do not involve transfer payments, and thus tend not to be 
perceived as disadvantaging anyone.
A challenge in crafting a Bismarckian solution for non-traditional 
workers is that it would need to accommodate a wide range of circum-
stances in a coherent way. Some independent workers might be reliant 
on income from independent work, making them scarcely different 
from employees. Others might work only a few hours per week. Some, 
particularly in the latter group, might be supplementing income they 
already earn from a part-time or full-time job. Some might switch from 
traditional forms of employment in one year to independent work in 
another year, while others might do both at the same time.
For those who perform only a minimal amount of independent 
work (eg in the collaborative economy), and who are not otherwise 
productively engaged, it might be inappropriate to expect the firm to 
provide the full range of social-protection benefits. Conversely, for 
those who work a substantial number of hours per week or month, it 
seems clear that they should not reach the ends of their careers and 
have no pension.
An ideal solution could involve a totalisation of benefits accrued 
from multiple sources and from multiple modes of work. Consider for 
instance systems such as Social Security in the United States, where 
contributions are made for all income, irrespective of whether it is 
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from wages or from self-employment income. Benefits are based on 
total contributions.
Especially with Bismarckian schemes, actual implementation 
responsibility need not rest solely with the government. Private 
insurance firms, unions or other organisations often have roles to play. 
This is particularly common for pension plans, health insurance and 
invalidity (disability) insurance. The development of the gig economy 
has contributed to the modernisation of insurance arrangements so 
that plans are becoming available that are better suited to new forms of 
work, including those in the collaborative economy.
Beveridge-type solutions make particular sense for forms of social 
protection from which all of society benefits (Kutzin, 2011). They pro-
tect all citizens, or all residents, not merely the families of all employ-
ees. A Beveridge-type approach might make the entire discussion of 
social protection for platform workers and for other non-traditional 
workers partly or fully irrelevant, since all would be protected by 
comprehensive mechanisms. However, universal protection can be 
expensive.
5.1.3 Comparative assessment of EU member states in terms of efficiency and 
equity
Sapir (2006) developed a typology that remains relevant today in 
which EU countries are classified relative to the EU average on two key 
measures that reflect labour policy: efficiency and equity. A member 
state’s social model was considered to be efficient if it provided suffi-
cient incentives to work and, therefore, if it generated relatively high 
employment rates. It was deemed to be equitable if it kept the level of 
poverty reasonably low.
Sapir (2006) used the national employment rate as an estimate of 
efficiency, and 1 minus the national poverty rate after social trans-
fers as an estimate of equity. The reasoning was that a social system 
is equitable if it prevents people from falling too far behind in terms 
of income, and it is efficient if it still provides productive labour with 
111 | DIGITALISATION AND EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
incentives to participate in the economy.
Relative to the overall EU values, member states were grouped into 
four quadrants:
• Front-runners that are both equitable and efficient; 
• Those that are inequitable but efficient; 
• Those that are equitable but inefficient; and
• Laggards that are neither equitable nor efficient. 
In Sapir (2006), these quadrants were described as the Nordic, 
Anglo-Saxon, Continental, and Mediterranean quadrants, with each 
corresponding closely to the geographical placement of the member 
states found in each quadrant. The member states in each cluster 
tended to be somewhat similar in terms of key characteristics, such as 
their social protection expenditure levels, the strength of their unions 
and the degree of wage compression.
The situation has evolved considerably since Sapir’s work more 
than a decade ago. The quadrants are still relevant, but they corre-
spond less well today to the geographic categorisation of Sapir (2006). 
Two major changes are visible:
• The accession of 13 countries since 2004 brings additional variation 
to the EU landscape of social security systems and represents a shift 
in the average EU poverty rate from roughly 15 percent in 2004 to 17 
percent in 2016; and
• The performance of some member states has changed markedly. 
We have built on Sapir (2006) by continuing to use the employment 
rate, but diverging slightly by using 1 minus the ‘at risk of poverty’ 
indicator. One might imagine that 1 minus the indicator measures 
the likelihood of not being at risk of poverty; however, Darvas (2017) 
demonstrated that the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator “essentially meas-
ures income inequality, not poverty”. The ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator is 
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available for 2005, the first full year after ten mainly former-communist 
countries acceded to the European Union, and only one year later than 
the data used in Sapir (2006). It is also available for 2016.
The level of labour participation in the EU15 versus the EU28 dif-
fered relatively little in 2016 (67.0 percent versus 66.6 percent, respec-
tively), and the same is true for 1 minus the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator 
(83.7 percent and 82.7 percent, respectively)28. In 2005, however, the 
then-new member states were not at the same level as the EU15 (with 
a 65.2 percent employment rate for the EU15 versus 63.3 percent for 
the EU28). In order to be able to compare between the years, and also 
to compare to Sapir (2006), we used EU15 averages to distinguish 
between the four quadrants in both years.
Figure 5.1 shows our results for the years 2005 and 2016, using four 
quadrants based on Sapir (2006). Data for 2005 appear in red, while 
data for 2016 appear in blue. In order to have a stable definition, how-
ever, we base our identification of quadrants on the 2005 data, which 
corresponds to the solid red lines in Figure 5.1.
EU15 efficiency was better in 2016 than in 2005 (with labour 
participation increasing from 65.2 percent to 67.0 percent). Equity, 
however, had worsened (declining from 84.8 percent to 83.7 percent). 
Graphically, the intersection of the blue lines has shifted lower and to 
the right compared to the intersection of the dashed red lines. Nine 
of the countries likewise show a trend toward greater efficiency at the 
cost of lower equity.
28 In this section, wherever we quote statistics for a group of member states, we are 
referring to the simple arithmetic mean of the individual member-state values.
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Figure 5.1: Shifts in efficiency and equity among EU member states, 2005 and 
2016
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data and the conceptual model of Sapir (2006).
Compared to the 2005 data, the 2016 data shows some noteworthy 
changes. At the same time, it is clear that the geographic classification 
of the quadrants as used in Sapir (2006) has blurred compared to the 
past.
Among the mainly Nordic countries that comprised the front-run-
ner quadrant in Sapir (2006), namely Austria, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, all continue to do well, but four of the five 
show large gains in efficiency at the expense of large declines in equity. 
Only Denmark shows a different trend, with a small decline in effi-
ciency and negligible movement in equity.
Germany increased its labour participation rate by an impressive 
9.2 points, but at significant cost in terms of increasing inequity as 
expressed by a decline of 4.3 points in the ‘at risk of poverty’ indicator. 
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The labour reforms set in motion under the Hartz Plan probably 
played a large role in the increase in labour participation; moreover, 
the increased participation of women in the German labour market 
(from 61.5 percent in 2006 to 70.8 percent in 2016) might have played 
a role.
Among the Mediterranean countries that comprised the laggard 
group, Spain, Greece and Italy all show substantial declines both 
in efficiency and in equity. In Italy and Spain, efficiency declined 
by 0.4 and 4.1 points, while equity declined by 1.4 and 2.1 points, 
respectively.
Little movement is visible among the equitable but inefficient con-
tinental countries. Efficiency in France increased by 0.4 points, while 
equity declined by 0.6 points. Belgium likewise shows little movement.
Among the efficient but inequitable countries that comprised the 
Anglo-Saxon group in Sapir (2006), Portugal and Ireland both show 
gains in equity coupled with a decline in efficiency. In the UK, how-
ever, efficiency increased by 1.7 points, while equity improved by 3.0 
points.
Our focus here is on the EU15 in order to facilitate comparison of 
2005 to 2016, but it is worth noting that some of the newer member 
states have also made substantial gains or losses. In Poland, for 
instance, efficiency increased by 11.7 points, while equity improved by 
3.6 points.
This analysis has clear implications for public policy. The cluster 
of laggards (including the Mediterranean countries Spain, Italy, and 
Greece) continues to slide, and seems to be ripe for labour market 
reform. Within the inefficient but equitable quadrant, Belgium and 
France have scarcely changed their respective positions. These coun-
tries would likewise appear to be ripe for labour market reform. 
Sapir (2006) argued persuasively that equity is to a significant 
degree a valid national political choice, but that efficiency is crucial 
in order to maintain competitiveness. This implies that enhancing 
efficiency should be a higher priority than enhancing equity. Reform 
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of labour policy in order to enable labour flexibility would thus appear 
to be in order for the equitable but inefficient quadrant, and especially 
for those in the laggard quadrant.
5.2 Gaps in the social protection of platform workers
The treatment of most platform workers as self-employed, despite 
dependency in some cases on the platforms for which they work, 
raises concerns about their social protection (ILO, 2018a; Codagnone 
et al, 2016). There is a growing recognition of the need to provide for 
these platform workers’ needs, ideally in a manner that meshes with 
other initiatives to achieve social protection for traditional workers, 
non-traditional workers and the self-employed in a comprehensive 
and holistic way.
There are six branches of social protection that have been promi-
nent in the discussion of the social protection of non-traditional work-
ers and the self-employed. These branches of social protection have 
been centre stage in the analysis and the policy measures put forward 
by the European Commission (see section 5.4.2), based on the analysis 
conducted in ESPN (2017). They are:
• Unemployment benefits; 
• Sickness benefits; 
• Maternity and equivalent paternity benefits;
• Invalidity benefits;
• Old age benefits; and 
• Benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases.
To provide perspective, it is useful to consider the relative mag-
nitudes of expenditure for these different branches of social protec-
tion. Old-age and survivors’ pensions tend to be the largest spending 
item, followed by sickness, health care and disability, but differences 
between member states are substantial.
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5.2.1 Gaps in statutory coverage
Existing social protection measures often provide little or no coverage 
of non-traditional workers in general and of platform workers in par-
ticular. These social protection arrangements were primarily designed 
with full-time employees in mind. Many were designed before the rise 
of the newer forms of non-standard employment, including tempo-
rary, multi-party or on-call, or more recently platform-based workers.
There are two main causes of limitations on the participation of 
platform workers in social protection schemes:
• The contracts of platform workers typically classify them as self-em-
ployed contractors. This often implies they are de facto excluded 
from social protection mechanisms provided to employees (Forde 
et al, 2017);
• Access to many benefits is conditional on a minimum number of 
hours worked per employer, on the duration of employment or 
on the earnings from a single employer (ILO, 2017). If a worker 
splits his or her efforts between two or more activities, or between 
traditional and non-traditional work, this compounds the risk that 
critical thresholds might not be reached.
Table 5.2 shows the statutory limitations on the main branches of 
social protection to which various forms of non-traditional workers are 
subject.
For the self-employed, the exclusions can be even more significant. 
Table 5.3 shows the statutory limitations to selected branches of social 
protection to which the self-employed are subject.
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Table 5.2: Lack of formal social security coverage for non-standard workers
Benefit type C
as
u
al
 
w
or
ke
rs
Se
as
on
al
 
w
or
ke
rs
N
at
io
n
al
 
sp
ec
ifi
ci
ti
es
Fr
ee
la
n
ce
A
p
p
re
n
ti
ce
s
T
ra
in
ee
s
V
oc
at
io
n
al
 
tr
ai
n
ee
s
Unemployment
RO, HU, 
MT, LT
BG, RO, 
LV, HU, 
MT, LT
ATa, CZb, 
DEc, PLd, 
SKe
BE, EL, 
HR, MT, 
NL, PL
EL, FR, 
IT, LT, 
MT, NL, 
PL, RO
Sickness
HU, LT, 
LV, RO
HU, LT, 
LV, RO
CZb, SId
BE, HU, 
NL, PL
DK, FR, 
HU, LT, 
NL, PL
DK, EL, 
FR, HU, 
PL
Maternity LT, RO
BG, LT, 
LV, RO
CZb, PLd, 
UKh
BG, FR BE, MT
FR, HU, 
IT, LT
EL, FR, 
HU, IT
Accident/
occupational 
injuries
RO, HR, 
LT
BG, LT, 
LV, RO
CZb, ESf
Old age/ 
survivors’ 
pensions
MT, LT
BG, HU, 
RO, LT
CZb, HUg, 
LUg, MTh, 
PLd
BE, HR, 
MT
EL, FR, 
HU, IT, 
LT, MT
Invalidity HU, LT HU, LT ATa, PLd
Source: European Commission (2018c, page 137). Notes: The table reports in which 
branches and in which member states non-standard workers are excluded from formal 
coverage in the sense that they have no mandatory coverage and cannot opt–in to vol-
untary schemes. National specificities: a) marginal part-timers; b) agreement to per-
form a job; c) mini-jobbers; d) civil law contracts; e) employees on ‘work agreement’ 
with irregular income; f ) domestic workers; g) on-call jobs; h) temporary agency work.
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Table 5.3: Lack of formal social security coverage for the self-employed
Unemployment benefits BEa, BG, CY, DE, FR, IE, IT, LV, MTb, NL, UKb
Sickness benefits ELa, IEb, ITa
Accident & occupational injuries BE, BG, CY, CZ, IE, LT, LV, NL, SK, UK
Source: European Commission (2018c, page 137). Notes: The table reports in which 
branches and in which member states at least one sub-group of the self-employed is 
excluded from formal coverage in the sense that they have no mandatory coverage and 
cannot opt -into voluntary schemes. a) Only one or more sub-groups of the self-em-
ployed are not formally covered. b) In these member states only means-tested benefits 
are available to the self-employed while they are excluded from contributory schemes.
In terms of the percentage of all workers who are entitled to key 
benefits such as maternity leave, sickness and unemployment cover, 
all member states have exclusions: however, the impacts vary substan-
tially in different member states (Table 5.4). These restrictions impact 
many non-traditional workers, not just platform workers.
Unemployment benefits are a particularly complex case, espe-
cially inasmuch as it can be challenging to identify what constitutes 
unemployment for a self-employed individual. For less-than-full-time 
employees, the statutory right to access benefits is often conditional on 
the fraction of a normal number of hours worked. Figure 5.3 shows the 
total potential entitlement to unemployment benefits by country, as 
well as entitlement of individuals who worked less than 33 percent of 
a normal work week, those who work more than 33 percent of a work 
week and the self-employed (who often have no access at all to unem-
ployment insurance).
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Table 5.4: Percent of workers not entitled to social protection benefits, by type 
of benefit and member state (2014)
  Maternity Sickness Unemployment
Luxembourg 6.9 1.5 2.5
Estonia 0.2 0.5 3.2
Ireland 6.9 5.5 4.1
Czechia 11.9 14.2 4.9
United Kingdom 8.3 0.2 5.0
Lithuania 15.5 9.8 5.0
Croatia 11.4 6.4 6.4
Hungary 11.2 0.3 7.1
Slovakia 3.9 0.1 7.4
Sweden 7.4 0.1 8.1
Germany 2.6 3.5 9.5
Austria 0.9 3.7 9.8
Finland 1.3 0.3 9.9
Slovenia 12.6 4.5 10.1
Portugal 3.0 13.2 11.0
Spain 7.4 6.4 12.4
Poland 13.2 17.1 12.7
EU 7.6 7.7 12.9
Latvia 0.5 0.7 13.2
France 4.1 3.3 13.8
Bulgaria 9.3 9.4 15.1
Malta 3.8 2.6 15.4
Denmark 11.5 6.9 15.4
Cyprus 2.9 3.0 17.2
Netherlands 0.7 12.7 17.9
Belgium 9.3 2.8 18.4
Italy 15.0 23.7 24.6
Romania 15.1 11.2 28.7
Greece 9.2 19.7 35.8
Source: European Commission (2018c, page 139).
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5.2.2 Gaps in access to social protection for those who have statutory coverage
Even for workers who are formally covered for a specific branch of 
social protection, there are often gaps in effective coverage (see also 
European Commission, 2018a). Many benefits are conditional on 
eligibility periods, or on a level of contributions over a period of years. 
As workers move between different forms of non-traditional work, they 
might not be able to meet the eligibility periods, or might not accrue 
enough combined time because the benefits from different forms of 
labour are not properly aggregated.
Rules are already in place29 to protect social protection rights 
when moving within the European Economic Area (EEA), which 
is comprised of the EU member states plus Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein. The rules cover sickness benefits; maternity and equiva-
lent paternity benefits; old-age pensions; pre-retirement and invalidity 
benefits; survivors’ benefits and death grants; unemployment benefits; 
family benefits; and benefits related to work accidents and occupa-
tional diseases. These ensure totalisation of benefits as an individual 
moves from one EEA member state to another, in accordance with the 
following principles (European Commission, 2018c):
• One country only: A person is covered by the social security sys-
tem of one member state at a time so that he/she only pays contri-
butions in one country. The person is entitled to benefits, if any, in 
the country where he/she pays contributions.
• Equal treatment or non-discrimination: A person moving to an-
other EU member state has the same rights and obligations as the 
nationals of the country where he/she is insured.
• Aggregation: When claiming a benefit, previous periods of insur-
ance, work or residence in other countries are taken into account 
if necessary (for example to demonstrate that the person satisfies a 
minimum period of insurance required under national law in order 
29 Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009.
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to be entitled to benefits).
• Exportability: If a person is entitled to receive a benefit in cash 
from one member state, he/she may generally receive it even if he/
she is living in a different member state.
Relative to platform work (and many other forms of non-traditional 
employment and self-employment), these measures fall short of the 
social protection that would appear to be needed. The European legis-
lation that is already in place seeks to address the problem of aggrega-
tion of benefits in terms of movement between the member states, but 
not domestically within a member state. It applies to various forms of 
non-traditional work, but does not cover the self-employed, and prob-
ably does not adequately cover most forms of platform work.
5.3 Labour market policies: platform work and worker 
classification
Our focus in this section is on the classification of non-traditional 
workers in general, and platform workers in particular. This classifica-
tion is crucial for today’s social protection systems.
A number of countries have established a third category of employ-
ment that represents an intermediate status between the widely used 
categories of employee and self-employed. The rationale is that this 
intermediate category offers more flexibility to platform workers than 
the status of employee, but might also provide social protection rights 
that are more proportionate and fit for purpose than the limited rights 
provided to the self-employed (Codagnone et al, 2016). Third cate-
gories of employment have already been implemented in Canada, 
Italy, Germany, Spain, South Korea and the United Kingdom. Box 1 
discusses several of these, based largely on the case study evidence in 
Cherry and Aloisi (2018).
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Box 1: Countries that have established a third category of work
Canada: In Canada, the concept of a third category of work was legally estab-
lished in the 1970s for ‘dependent contractors’. The criteria for inclusion 
in this category are: i) the economic dependence of the contractor on the 
purchaser of services (determined by the level of exclusivity); and ii) the 
contractor providing services essentially individually ie without employees 
of his/her own (Cherry and Aloisi, 2018).
The rights associated with this intermediary status are effectively the 
same as those of employees when it comes to collective bargaining (Labour 
Relations Act, 1995; see https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/95l01). 
Dependent contractors are also entitled to notice of termination according to 
the Ontario Court of Appeal (McKee v. Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd, 2009).
Germany: In Germany, a category of ‘employee-like person’ was legally 
established in 1974. The criteria for a worker to be included in this category 
are that the worker should be: i) working for the benefit of a client; ii) under 
a contract for a specific project; iii) providing the service personally and 
essentially without employees of his own; iv) mainly working for one client; 
and v) relying on one client for at least 50 percent of his/her income.
The rights associated with this intermediary status include many of the 
same rights enjoyed by employees: unionisation and collective bargaining, 
parental leave, paid holidays and protection from harassment (Cherry and 
Aloisi, 2018).
Italy: In Italy, a category of ‘quasi-subordinate workers’ was legally estab-
lished in 1973. The criteria for a worker to be included in this category relied 
on the worker: i) collaborating with the buyer of services; ii) being in a 
continuous and long-standing relationship the buyer of services; iii) coordi-
nating functionally with the buyer of services; and iv) providing the service 
essentially individually ie without employees of his/her own.
The additional rights associated with this status in comparison to those 
of self-employed contractors are very limited. These workers gained access 
to dispute resolution mechanisms, but they were not protected by substan-
tive labour law, and they were not entitled to labour rights, sick or parental 
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leave, overtime pay or protection against unfair dismissal, among others 
(Cherry and Aloisi, 2018).
Spain: In Spain, a category of ‘economically dependent self-employed work-
ers’ was legally established in 2007. The criteria used to assess whether a 
worker is included in this category are: i) being a natural person providing 
services in a personal capacity; ii) dependence for at least 75 percent of 
income on a single client; iii) registration of the position with the social 
administration agency; iv) confirmation by the buyer of services to the 
social administration agency; and v) notification of changes to the position, 
if any, to the social administration agency (Cherry and Aloisi, 2018; Cabeza 
Pereiro, 2008).
The rights extended to these dependent self-employed workers are 
largely the same as those of employees (Cherry and Aloisi, 2018). These 
include the presumption of the existence of an indefinite duration contract, 
the same working time provisions as for employees, protection against 
unfair dismissal, a new form of collective bargaining mechanism (‘profes-
sional interest agreements’) and access to labour tribunals (Cabeza Pereiro, 
2008).
South Korea: In South Korea, a statutory category of ‘special type work-
ers’ was created by an amendment to the Korean Industrial Accident 
Compensation Insurance Act in 2010 (see http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/
korLawEng?pstSeq=58002). The criteria used to assess whether a worker 
is included in this category are: i) the routine provision of labour necessary 
for the operation of the purchaser of services; ii) presence of payments for 
these services; iii) living on these payments; iv) that the worker does not 
rely on other persons to provide the labour service; and v) that the worker is 
involved in one of the specific activities listed in a presidential decree asso-
ciated with the act30 (Cherry and Aloisi, 2018).
The rights in terms of compensation and insurance for industrial acci-
dents that are extended to workers in this category are identical to those of 
30 This list includes, for example, insurance salespersons, visiting teachers, quick 
service drivers and exclusive chauffeur service workers.
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regular employees.
United Kingdom: In the United Kingdom, an intermediate category for casual 
workers was legally created in 1996 (Employment Rights Act, 1996; see 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/contents). The criteria for a 
worker to be included in this category are: i) personal provision of services to 
the counterparty; and ii) the counterparty not having the contractual status 
of client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on 
by the worker. The interpretation of these general criteria in the courts has 
resulted in four additional effective criteria: iii) a significant extent of supervi-
sion of the worker by the counterparty; iv) integration of the worker’s service 
into the core business of the counterparty; v) the economic realities of the 
relationship justify this status, based on a range of factors31; and vi) whether 
there are ongoing contractual obligations to provide the services (Garben, 
2017).
The rights associated with this category are more limited than those of 
employees, but include coverage by the national minimum wage, working 
time rights, data protection, the right to time off for family emergencies and 
rights to a safe and healthy work environment (Garben, 2017).
These different approaches to the establishment of third or inter-
mediate categories of work have helped to extend protection to 
genuinely dependent self-employed workers, but some have been 
more successful than others. While Canada’s is generally considered 
a success, Italy’s third category of employment resulted in arbitrage 
opportunities for employers leading to many employees being reclas-
sified as dependent self-employed.
Some experts argue that adding a third category of work, no matter 
31 These include, among others: a) whether the worker is in business on his/her own 
account; b) payment methods; c) supply of equipment; d) schedule and holiday 
arrangements; e) financial risk; and f ) the worker’s ability to provide substitutes to 
carry out the tasks instead of personally providing the services (European Agency 
for Safety and Health at Work, 2017). 
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how well designed, would be of limited value to platform workers 
because the contractual presumption of self-employed status pre-
empts the ability of platform workers to access the benefits of the 
intermediary category without first achieving reclassification through 
the courts (Cherry and Aloisi, 2018; Codagnone et al, 2016).
5.4 Labour market policies and automation
5.4.1 Measures taken or tried at member-state level
The measures taken or tried to date have sought to achieve one of 
more of three goals:
• Ensuring that platform workers fall within a category of employ-
ment (possibly a new category) that provides for adequate social 
protection (see section 5.3);
• Ensuring portability of benefits; and
• Ensuring the right to organise and to bargain collectively.
Benefits portability refers to the ability of individuals on the labour 
market to transfer certain benefits that they have accrued from one 
job to the next, across economic sectors and across employment 
categories. Benefits portability could potentially apply in the future 
not only to traditional and non-traditional workers, but also to the 
self-employed.
There are good reasons to attach relevant benefits to an individual 
rather than a position, an employer or even a status of work, regardless 
of the professional path taken by that individual (Auguste et al, 2015). 
The ILO also recommends portability of benefits as a way to ensure 
both flexibility and protection in the modern economy (ILO, 2016). 
In France, for example, portability is established through a Personal 
Activity Account that preserves accumulated rights to training, hard-
ship compensation, work time recuperation and more. This portability 
provides better coverage in the event of professional transitions.
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Portability has its place, but is not a panacea for the needs of plat-
form workers. Portability does not address minimum wage rights, for 
instance, or the right to collective action (Codagnone et al, 2016).
A second strand of literature has instead emphasised the cru-
cial importance of ensuring effective access to a mechanism for 
collective bargaining as a means of ensuring protection of platform 
workers. Freedom of association and collective bargaining are fun-
damental labour rights helping workers to avoid exploitation, and 
are established in the ILO Constitution and reaffirmed by the 1998 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO, 
2011). Principle 8 of the European Pillar of Social Rights likewise calls 
on social partners to respect the right to collective action and to con-
clude collective agreements (European Union, 2017).
In most cases, platform workers are treated contractually as being 
self-employed. As long as this is the case, they generally have no legal 
right to collective bargaining (Forde et al, 2017; Riley, 2017). In a few 
cases, courts have over-ridden platform worker contracts and rec-
ognised that they fulfil many of the conditions of employment and 
should therefore be accorded the right to bargain collectively. 
Several other factors make it difficult for platform workers to 
exercise freedom of association (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018). First, as 
platforms leverage digital technologies, workers are often dispersed 
geographically and do not routinely interact with each other. Second, 
many platforms are designed to put service providers into competition 
with one another. Several platforms have rating systems that make 
workers reluctant to attempt to exercise their rights because of the 
potential reputational costs. Finally, the ability of platforms to monitor 
and exclude uncooperative service providers might strengthen plat-
forms’ bargaining power, and might thus make workers reluctant to act 
collectively (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018).
A number of experts argue more broadly in favour of strengthen-
ing platform workers’ collective bargaining rights. Unionisation helps 
to prevent abuses of human rights and of fundamental labour rights, 
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which are allegedly common in some segments of the platform econ-
omy (De Stefano and Aloisi, 2018). Drawing a parallel with pre-first 
world war dock workers’ own gig economy, Riley (2017) highlighted 
the historical role of collective action in ensuring the development of 
fairer working conditions over time. Forde et al (2017, p. 107) argued 
that collective representation “would offer numerous potential advan-
tages in terms of redressing the very considerable power imbalances” 
common in the platform economy. Forde et al (2017) recommended 
reforming existing collective bargaining institutions and competition 
rules to ensure greater representation of platform workers in the social 
dialogue. 
Box 2: Legal measures in France
France: The French law of August 2016 (LOI n° 2016-1088 du 8 août 2016 
relative au travail, à la modernisation du dialogue social et à la sécurisation 
des parcours professionnels, also called loi Travail), represents a recent 
attempt to deal in a consistent way with multiple aspects of social protec-
tion. The law’s primary objective is to reinforce the collective bargaining 
process within companies, while providing companies with greater flexibility. 
It also addresses benefits portability and the right to collective action.
The law established new mechanisms for the portability of benefits via 
its Personal Activity Account (Compte personnel d’activité), which enables 
the time worked in different jobs to be aggregated for purposes of deter-
mining eligibility and for establishing the level of funding for training and 
for hardship benefits. The law also strengthened rights to lifelong training, 
unionisation and insurance against work accidents. Importantly, the law also 
extended these rights to platform workers (see also Garben, 2017).
While the law has been very unpopular among unions, French and IMF 
economists have been overall very positive. They have highlighted the 
impact of the law in making the labour market more dynamic while preserv-
ing the right to social dialogue (Golla, 2016; IMF, 2016).
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5.4.2 The European Commission’s Council Recommendation (European 
Commission, 2018a)
The ability for the EU/EEA to act on social protection is constrained by 
the principle of subsidiarity. The normal tendency is to think of respon-
sibility for social protection as resting primarily with the member 
states, not with the EU; however, the EU has a complementary role to 
play. According to the TFEU, “social policy, for the aspects defined in this 
Treaty” is identified as a “[s]hared competence between the Union and 
the Member States … The Union may take initiatives to ensure coordina-
tion of Member States’ social policies” (Art. 4(2) and Art. 5 TFEU).
The EU has for instance explicit authority to safeguard if needed the 
effective free movement of individuals, particularly in relation to the 
portability of benefits. The rules at EU level to protect social protection 
rights when moving from one member state to another32 are impor-
tant, and were discussed in section 5.2.2.
Additional powers complementary to those of the member states 
are identified in Articles 151-156 TFEU, with the EU given some 
authority over workplace health and safety issues, working conditions, 
social protection and the rights of employees made redundant.
At European level, limited coordinating measures have been in 
place for some many years33.
32 Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009.
33 Among them are Council Recommendation of 27 July 1992 on the convergence of 
social protection objectives and policies (92/442/EEC), OJ L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 49–52; 
Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2008 on the active inclusion of people 
excluded from the labour market (C(2008) 5737), OJ L 307, 18.11.2008, p. 11–14; 
Commission Communication Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion 
– including implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020, COM (2013)83; A re-
newed commitment to social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination 
for Social Protection and Social Inclusion’, COM(2008) 418 final; Council Decision 
(EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the 
Member States for 2015, OJ L 268, 15.10.2015, Country-specific recommendations; 
Modernising and improving social protection in the European Union, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM (97) 102 final, 12 March 1997; Fixed-Term Work 
Directive 1999/70/EC; Part-time Work Directive 97/81/EC; and more.
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The EU and in particular the European Commission have sought 
to strengthen and modernise social protection in the EU. At the 
strategic level, this is visible in the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(European Union, 2017). At the legislative level, it is mainly visible in 
a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers 
and the self-employed (European Commission, 2018a and European 
Commission, 2018b)34.
The Commission formulated the legislation as a Council 
Recommendation. This is a flexible format that does not create binding 
outcomes, and that leaves great flexibility to the member states.  It 
should be viewed as a pragmatic compromise. As the Commission put 
it, “The Recommendation responds to the need to act at EU level, while 
taking into account the lack of political consensus, at this point in time, 
on the direction of the reforms” (European Commission, 2018a).
The Commission’s stated goals include:
• Enhanced social protection for non-traditional workers and the 
self-employed: “Overall, if the measures proposed in the Recom-
mendation are fully implemented by Member States, non-standard 
workers and the self-employed, who represent all together 39% of the 
employed population, will benefit from better protection. … Current-
ly, non-standard workers face a much higher risk of poverty (16% 
compared to 6% for standard workers in 2016) as a result of low in-
come and gaps in coverage. Similarly, social protection systems play 
a much weaker role in reducing the poverty risk for the self-employed 
compared to salaried workers on average in the EU.” (European 
Commission, 2018a)
• Mobility for workers: “Well-designed social protection systems 
may also facilitate participation in the labour market by supporting 
labour market transition for individuals who switch jobs, move in or 
34 This Council Recommendation was unanimously approved the by the ministers for 
employment and social affairs of the EU member states in December 2018.
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out of work, start a company or close it down. … Reducing differenc-
es in access to social protection is also expected to encourage transi-
tions between contract types and labour market statuses, promoting 
labour market dynamism.” (European Commission, 2018a)
• Levelling the playing between traditional and non-traditional 
firms: Businesses could benefit from reduced unfair competition, 
a possible increase in productivity of individuals in the newly-pro-
tected forms of employment and self-employment and from posi-
tive effects on labour market dynamism.
The Council Recommendation would apply not only to traditional 
and non-traditional workers, but also, significantly, to the self-em-
ployed. It would apply to six major branches of social protection:
• Unemployment benefits (but not necessarily for the self-em-
ployed);
• Sickness and health care benefits;
• Maternity and equivalent paternity benefits;
• Invalidity benefits;
• Old-age benefits; and
• Benefits in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases.
The Council Recommendation would oblige member states to 
ensure that all workers, including non-traditional workers and the 
self-employed, enjoy a basic level of social protection. The detailed 
mechanisms are, however, left to the member states, as are judg-
ments about benefit levels and programme financing. The Council 
Recommendation also seeks to promote portability among different 
forms of work, and transparency on behalf of workers. (European 
Commission, 2018a, page 8).
The Council Recommendation also encourages member states to 
ensure (1) that all periods of work are taken into account, and that 
they are accumulated and transferrable across all types of work and 
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self-employment; (2) that the level of social protection is adequate, 
taking into account conditions in the member state; and (3) that full 
information about all social protection arrangements are widely and 
freely available.
The Council Recommendation does not oblige member states to 
take particular actions but it does require each country to develop a 
plan showing how it will implement the Council Recommendation. 
The Commission would then monitor and benchmark implementation 
through the European Semester and the Open Method of Coordination 
for Social Inclusion and Social Protection.
5.4.3 Other solutions that have been discussed
Additional recommendations to address the social protection needs of 
platform workers are discussed in the literature.
Felstiner (2011) was one of the first to study crowdsourcing and 
the platform economy, and identified some of the key problems that 
legal scholars, judges and policymakers would face with the rise of this 
new form of labour market. As a potential solution, he highlighted the 
possibility of defaulting to an employee status for work taking place 
over the internet, so long as the work relationship fulfils some clearly 
defined conditions (Felstiner, 2011). In the same vein, Cherry and 
Aloisi (2018) also suggested a default presumption of employee status 
as the way forward, largely in light of mixed experience in countries 
that attempted instead to define a third category of work (see sec-
tion 5.3). This presumption would be subject to the worker satisfying 
specific standards, such as a threshold number of hours worked per 
month, to ensure that the presumed employee status does not discour-
age the truly collaborative or irregular use of platforms (Cherry and 
Aloisi, 2018).
While a default presumption of employment status would have the 
benefit of simplicity that benefit unfortunately comes at the cost of 
a loss of flexibility and the risk of distortions. Given the great variety 
of platforms and of workers’ motives for working via these platforms, 
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it is unlikely that a single threshold (eg based on number of hours 
worked) would suffice for the majority of workers. The presumption 
of employment would avoid the risk of some forms of misclassifica-
tion, but might introduce other misclassification risks, and does not 
prevent arbitrage across categories. Such an approach might incentiv-
ise platforms and other companies to impose a limit on the number of 
hours worked by their workers (either explicitly or implicitly) in order 
to avoid classification as employees. Conversely, platform workers and 
other self-employed workers might be incentivised to perform their 
duties more slowly or to undertake less value-added work in order to 
rack up more hours.
Empirically, the presumption of employment has not worked well 
to resolve classification difficulties (Garben, 2017). In the Netherlands, 
the presumption of employment has led to contradictory judicial 
conclusions, even for workers within the same industry. In Belgium, 
while the presumption has not yet been tested in the courts, courts 
have precedents in refusing to reclassify self-employed workers as 
employed (Garben, 2017). 
Based on an extensive review of the literature, Codagnone et al 
(2016) suggested broadening minimum wage regulations, enforcing 
maximum daily hours and minimal forms of social protection, pro-
viding some form of health and liability insurance, ensuring health 
and safety standards are respected and (as previously noted) ensuring 
portability of benefits. They also emphasised the need to regulate the 
type and intensity of monitoring and control allowed over platform 
workers (Codagnone et al, 2016).
Riley (2017) provided a case study of measures put in place to 
protect truck-owning drivers dependent on forestry companies in 
Australia. As well as the right to associate, the reforms included acces-
sible and affordable dispute resolution mechanisms, protection from 
unfair termination, legally scrutinised decent remuneration and, inter-
estingly, reducing information asymmetry through the publication of 
the costs of forestry companies (Riley, 2017). The case study shows that 
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solutions to the social protection needs of platform workers could take 
many different forms. Government intervention might not always be 
necessary. For example, the insurance industry is currently respond-
ing to the rise of the platform economy: innovation in that field has 
led to the development of insurance products suitable for dependent 
self-employed workers35. Such innovative products might also make 
social insurance more efficient for both employers and employees.
5.5 Digital skills, education and training
The rapid transformation of the workplace implies the growing need 
to regard education not as a one-time activity but as a lifelong pro-
cess. This need is widely recognised, but Europe lags behind its global 
competitors in many important respects. Notably, those who take 
part in lifelong-learning activities appear in many cases to be those 
who already have high levels of skills, while those with lesser skills 
also appear to have less opportunity to benefit from lifelong-learning 
opportunities. Those who are young and just out of school make more 
use than those who are older; those who work for large firms have 
greater opportunities than those who work for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which desperately need to upgrade their skills 
bases and their take-up of digital technology (Figure 5.4). That the 
young participate more can also be interpreted more positively, how-
ever, in that it might imply that the importance of lifelong learning is 
growing over time.
35 The Economist (2018) ‘Your policy is arriving in three minutes – Insurance 
and the gig economy’, 5 April, available at https://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21739984-how-insurance-policies-are-being-adapt-
ed-fit-freelance-working-insurance-and.
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Figure 5.4: Probability36 of having attended a lifelong learning course or activity 
within the previous four weeks, 2016
Source: European Commission (2018c, page 99).
36 The values are the result of a regression analysis. Each value is the quotient of the 
probability of an individual in that group having undertaken a lifelong learning 
course or activity during the previous four weeks, divided by the probability of 
an individual in the corresponding reference group having undertaken a lifelong 
learning course or activity during the previous four weeks. The probability for indi-
viduals in each reference group is represented by the black bar in the group, which 
explains why each black bar has a value of 1.0 (ie it is divided by itself ).
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6 Recommendations
Key findings
• Automation, artificial intelligence and robotisation are sure to have 
a huge impact on the workplace in the coming years; however, they 
will not necessarily lead to massive unemployment.
 – To date, the use of robots and ICTs does not appear to be associ-
ated with a marked increase in unemployment.
 – Artificial intelligence and related technologies will potentially 
have a far broader impact than robotisation, touching not only 
manufacturing (a relatively small sector) but also all service 
sectors.
 – In the medium to long term, the combined impact of AI, big 
data and machine learning is difficult to predict. These technol-
ogies will eliminate some existing jobs but will also create new 
jobs. Predictions that were popular a few years ago that half the 
population might be unemployed now seem unlikely.
• There is a related and growing tendency in developed economies 
towards job polarisation, with routine jobs requiring moderate 
levels of skill declining relative to both those at the bottom (that 
require fewer skills) and those at the top (that require greater skill 
levels).
• Labour flexibility that increases over time has been with us for 
decades, but automation is accelerating this trend and is giving rise 
to new forms of work.
• Current social protection arrangements are geared toward tra-
ditional employees. Non-traditional employees and the self-em-
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ployed tend to be exposed to gaps in statutory coverage.
• Even if statutory coverage is available, non-traditional employees 
and the self-employed might have difficulty exercising their social 
protection rights because the time worked as they change from one 
status to another is not properly accumulated. 
• The social protection arrangements of EU countries vary greatly in 
terms of efficiency, equity and the degree to which social protec-
tion is universal and funded out of general revenues (Beveridgean) 
versus being oriented mainly to workers and their families, and 
paid for by workers (Bismarckian).
No EU country is purely worker-funded or purely universal, but 
there are major differences between them, and these have implica-
tions in terms of performance. Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the 
Netherlands have long been characterised by a heavy tilt toward 
universal (Beveridgean) arrangements (Schoukens, 2000). These four 
countries have also consistently been among the very best performers 
in the EU in terms of both efficiency and equity. 
6.1 Adequate social protection for all workers
The growth of labour flexibility together with the increasing richness 
and complexity of work relationships poses new challenges for the 
social protection of workers (as explained in chapter 5). There are 
three key aspects to this problem.
First, many workers whose circumstances are not very different 
from those of traditional employees are not classified as employees. 
To the extent that national social protection systems treat them as 
self-employed, they tend to be excluded from statutory protection in 
many EU countries (see section 6.1.1).
Second, even when workers are correctly classified as non-tra-
ditional employees or as self-employed, it does not mean they have 
no need of social protection. The need for protection against illness, 
old age, invalidity and occupational hazards is just as real for these 
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workers as for any other37 (see section 6.1.2).
Third, workers are far more likely to switch between traditional 
employment, non-traditional employment (eg part-time) and self-em-
ployment than in the past, and with far greater frequency. These 
workers might not be able to aggregate time worked and contributions 
made in order to qualify for benefits at an appropriate level (see sec-
tion 6.1.3).
The EU has little direct power in these areas, but a Council 
Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the 
self-employed (European Commission, 2018) was unanimously agreed 
by EU countries in December 2018. The principles embodied by the 
Council Recommendation potentially address most of the challenges 
outlined above; however, the problems are still far from solved. While 
the Council Recommendation has moral force, it lacks legal force. 
Social protection systems in EU countries are very diverse – imple-
mentation is likely to vary greatly from one member state to the next, 
and some might choose to implement the Recommendation in ways 
that fall short of fully addressing the problems that are visible. Whether 
the Council Recommendation can truly deliver the changes in social 
protection that are needed remains to be seen.
With that in mind, the recommendations in this section take the 
principles in the Council Recommendation as a given, but explore the 
likely practicality and effectiveness of the different ways in which EU 
countries might implement them.
6.1.1 Avoiding misclassification of workers
There would be obvious benefits in achieving a harmonised, EU-level 
definition of what constitutes an employee versus a self-employed 
individual. The emergence of platform workers has increased the 
immediacy of the issue, but concerns stemming from the lack of 
37 For the self-employed who have their own employees, this is somewhat less the 
case. They often have the means to self-insure.
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clarity in these definitions have been visible for decades (see for 
instance Schoukens, 2000). The criteria that would need to be taken 
into account in order for an individual to be treated partly or fully as 
an employee are already somewhat clear in the rules established in 
some member states that have established a third category of work 
(including Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK; see section 5.3) – the 
performance of personal services for someone else, where the worker 
is dependent on the purchaser of the services for a substantial portion 
of his or her income, and the worker does not have employees of his or 
her own.
It is very difficult to see how to put common EU definitions in 
place. Under the TFEU, these definitional aspects of social protection 
clearly fall to member states, not to the EU. As with most aspects of 
social protection, the definitions of ‘employee’ and ‘self-employ-
ment’ vary greatly in different EU countries (Schoukens, 2000). Most 
member-state definitions of self-employment already incorporate 
the notion that a self-employed individual is practicing a professional 
activity for the purpose of gain without being an employee or a civil 
servant. Most definitions reflect to some degree the notion that a 
self-employed individual is not subordinate to the party for whom the 
work is performed; details of interpretation, however, vary consider-
ably. Even within a single member state, determination of self-em-
ployment status might differ in relation to different forms of social 
protection, or in relation to social protection, labour law and tax law. 
More to the point, the impact of classification of a worker’s status on 
the social protection benefits he or she receives is highly specific to the 
member states. EU Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of 
social security systems explicitly defers to the member state’s definition 
of “activity as an employed person” and “activity as a self-employed 
person”. Finally, any definition at EU level might easily collide with the 
various definitions of a ‘third category of work’ that already exist in 
several EU countries.
None of this means, however, that the EU does not have a role to 
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play. Most member states recognise that these classification issues 
have become increasingly problematic, and that sham self-employ-
ment should be prevented. The Commission should promote consen-
sus and convergence among the member states on the classification 
of self-employment, and identify and promote best practices that have 
been implemented by individual countries.
In the medium to longer term, the more promising solution might 
be to ensure the adequacy of benefits provided to dependent self-em-
ployed individuals. In member states where this is already the case, the 
determination of employee versus self-employed status becomes an 
uncontentious technical determination38.
6.1.2 Statutory coverage of non-traditional workers and the self-employed
Under Articles 8 and 9 of the Council Recommendation, “Member 
States should ensure that workers have access to social protection by 
extending formal coverage on a mandatory basis to all workers, regard-
less of the type of their employment relationship.” This would cover on 
a mandatory basis sickness and healthcare benefits, maternity/pater-
nity benefits, old age and invalidity benefits and benefits in respect of 
accidents at work and occupational diseases. Unemployment benefits 
for the self-employed would be on a voluntary basis.
This might seem to be clear enough: member states should ensure 
adequate social protection for non-traditional workers and the 
self-employed. But the member states enjoy great latitude in terms 
of how to implement this in practice. We would expect that low-cost 
member states will determine adequacy to be reached at substantially 
lower payment levels than in high-cost member states.
Under the Council Recommendation, differences in arrangements 
between traditional employees, non-traditional employees and the 
38 Schoukens (2000) argued that in member states that implement universal coverage 
for all, “the distinction between workers and self-employed people is of little impor-
tance because the social security benefits are not linked to the practise of labour in 
the first place.”
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self-employed “should be proportionate and reflect the specific situa-
tion of beneficiaries.” Again, it will be important to see how member 
states implement these guidelines.
Who pays for benefits and who is entitled to receive benefits are of 
profound importance. Under a universal (Beveridgean) system, all cit-
izens (or all residents) are covered, so the question of self-employment 
is irrelevant in terms of eligibility for coverage.
Conversely, a system based on worker contributions faces chal-
lenges in covering employees who work less than a full schedule. For 
a worker who is active for, say, ten hours a week, where should the 
funding come from to ensure proper health care? Health-care costs 
are presumably independent, more or less, of the number of hours 
worked. Irrespective of whether the payment is made by the employer, 
the employee or both, funding of social protection for occasional 
workers would appear to be challenging.
Perhaps the most important questions revolve around how to 
finance these arrangements (see section 6.2). These manifest differ-
ently in universal versus worker-funded systems, but both face signifi-
cant challenges.
6.1.3 Aggregation and transferability of benefits across different modes of work
For employees, portability of benefits between EU member states 
already exists under Regulations (EC) 883/2004 and 987/2009. There 
is no assurance of portability of benefits within a single member state, 
nor is there assurance of portability across different types of work (for 
instance, between traditional employment and self-employment).
The Council Recommendation seeks to put sweeping reforms in 
place, stating that “Member States should ensure that entitlements … 
are accumulated, preserved and transferable across all types of employ-
ment and self-employment statuses and across economic sectors”.
This would appear to be the right principle. In particular, under a 
worker-funded system, it would mean for example that a worker who 
spends part of his or her day as a self-employed platform worker (eg 
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driving for Uber) and part of the day as a part-time employee of a taxi 
firm could derive the full social protection benefits from his or her 
combined volume of work.
Portability of benefits from one member state to another is already 
covered for traditional employees. With an increasing fraction of the 
EU labour force comprised of non-traditional employees and the 
self-employed, the guarantees provided in current regulations cover 
less and less of the workforce.
This issue tends to manifest itself somewhat differently in a uni-
versal (Beveridgean) system. It might however become an issue for 
a worker who moves from a worker-funded to a universal-coverage 
member state.
6.1.4 A shift in the direction of universal benefits
Many of these issues are simpler in a so-called Beveridgean system 
where benefits are available to all. Eligibility is not tied to the status of 
the worker and totalisation of benefits is of little relevance as long as 
the worker remains in the member state. Once coverage is extended to 
all citizens or all residents, instead of to all employees, these problems 
should in principle largely be solved.
The distinction between worker-paid benefits and universal 
benefits is not black and white, not absolute. No EU country is purely 
Bismarckian, nor is any member state Beveridgean in every respect. 
Even the countries that are viewed as being closes to universal in their 
coverage (such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
the UK) are in reality hybrids where worker funding applies to some 
aspects of social protection (Schoukens, 2000).
With this in mind, we doubt that an overall shift of EU social protec-
tion systems to a universal, Beveridgean basis is likely. A mix of social 
protection arrangements is likely to persist for many decades at least. 
A shift to worker funding playing a smaller role, and universal coverage 
with funding from general revenues playing a greater role, is possible 
and perhaps inevitable.
146 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 30
Such a shift would tend not only to change who bears the cost of 
social protection, but might also represent a significant increase in 
the cost of social protection because more people would need to be 
covered. How should any increase in cost be paid for? We return to this 
issue in section 6.2.
6.1.5 Private enterprise to the rescue
As noted in section 5.4.3, some insurance companies are adapting 
their plans in order to meet the needs of self-employed workers.
This is unlikely to satisfy all social protection needs of all non-tra-
ditional workers – first because their needs are too diverse, and 
second because the information asymmetries between insurers and 
the insured in respect of some of the risks in question are too great. 
Enhancements to private insurance plans might nonetheless have a 
useful role to play in some member states.
6.1.6 Participation in social dialogue
As noted in section 5.4.1, the self-employed are prohibited in many 
member states from participating in social dialogue (which includes 
joining unions and participating in strikes).
It seems fairly clear that this prohibition is inappropriate today for 
various forms of the dependent self-employed. The participation in 
social dialogue of drivers who work for ride-hailing services cannot be 
said to be anticompetitive, nor is it much different from the participa-
tion of drivers who work as employees for conventional taxi services.
It seems equally clear, however, that organisations that participate 
in social dialogue will need to modernise and adapt in order to remain 
relevant in the workplace of the future. The kind of workplace social 
interactions that facilitated solidarity with trade unions are lacking 
today for many platform workers, and also for many workers who 
primarily telecommute.
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6.1.7 Preserving the dignity of workers
A topic that has not been very prominent in the debate, but that is 
likely to become more visible, has to do with the introduction of inten-
sive surveillance into the workplace.
The concern here is that firms monitor the efficiency of their work-
ers in carrying out their tasks. In and of itself, this is nothing new or 
nefarious – firms have always sought to know how their workers per-
form. Time and motion studies have been with us for than a hundred 
years.
However, for many of the new forms of work that are mediated by 
digital platforms, the ability of firms to perform surveillance on the 
worker is enormous. At what point does this become an improper 
intrusion against the dignity of the worker?
There is no easy answer. It would appear that a balance must be 
struck. Firms have a right, in the interest of efficiency, to monitor the 
performance of their employees, but this cannot be at the expense of 
turning the workplace into a surveillance state.
6.2 Funding the welfare state
The measures outlined in section 6.1 entail increased social protec-
tion expenditure, implying challenges for the funding of the EU social 
model. Once again, the challenges are different in worker-funded 
Bismarckian systems compared to universal-coverage Beveridgean 
systems. All EU member states are hybrids reflecting some mix of the 
two, but nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish between the two for 
purposes of analysis. 
6.2.1 Challenges to funding
The EU funding model for social protection is under threat, even in 
the absence of any need to expand social protection, for a variety of 
reasons:
• Declining labour share: The share of gross value added attribut-
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able to labour, as distinct from capital, has been declining for the 
past two decades (see section 1.4);
• Demographic challenges: With an aging population, fewer work-
ers must support more retirees, and the retirees who live longer 
tend to run up greater health costs; 
• Base erosion/profit shifting challenges: At the same time that the 
contribution of labour to the funding of social protection is declin-
ing for the reasons just noted, the ability to tax highly-profitable 
digital firms is also under threat because of the ease with which 
profits can be shifted to low-tax jurisdictions.
6.2.2 Solutions in a worker-funded Bismarckian system
The challenges to funding in a worker-funded system follow directly 
from the challenges identified in section 6.2.1. Contributions to social 
protection would generally come from workers, but the contribution of 
workers to the economy is declining, and moreover a declining relative 
fraction of workers is burdened with supporting an increasing relative 
fraction of retirees.
The impact of expanding coverage to non-traditional workers and 
to the self-employed is complex. Many EU countries already provide 
some benefits to the self-employed, and many make some collections 
from the self-employed. Similarly, if large numbers of the self-em-
ployed were to be re-classified in line with the discussion in section 
6.1.1, there would be impact on both expenditures and tax revenues 
associated with the re-classified workers.
Furthermore, there are limits to the extent to which it is prudent 
to increase social protection contributions from employers. To the 
extent that employers perceive the higher contributions as a cost of 
production, it might lead them to employ fewer workers, or (depend-
ing on price elasticity of labour versus capital) to substitute equipment 
for workers at a faster pace. This potentially might make the problem 
worse, not better.
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Under these conditions, it is difficult to expand coverage and thus 
to incur increased social protection costs. It is difficult to reconcile 
rising costs with a shrinking funding base.
It seems clear that, in the medium term if not the near term, other 
funding sources need to be found. No EU member state is purely 
worker-funded today. A further shift away from worker funding seems 
inevitable in the medium term.
6.2.3 Solutions in a universal coverage Beveridgean system
A shift in the direction of more universal, Beveridgean systems seems 
to be inevitable in the medium term. The universal system is poten-
tially simpler and more manageable in that the level of funding is 
somewhat de-coupled from the number of workers and the earnings 
per worker. The structure of payments for the funding of social protec-
tion is superior to that of a purely worker-funded system.
Society as a whole must, however, continue to be productive for this 
to be sustainable.
Costs might be higher in a universal system compared to a work-
er-funded system because more workers are covered. Or perhaps not 
– in a progressive European economy, the most basic social protection 
is likely to be provided to all anyway, even in a member state where 
social protection is primarily based on worker funding.
Universal coverage systems will also need to guard carefully against 
so-called welfare tourism. If it is too easy to move to a member state 
in order to collect generous benefits, the system risks becoming both 
economically and politically unsustainable.
In a universal coverage Beveridgean system, payments come from 
general revenues rather than from funds earmarked for social pro-
tection. This might help to avoid distortions, but funding must be 
adequate.
It is likely that tax revenues to fund social protection will need to 
come increasingly from capital rather than from labour. This begs the 
question of how an increase in general revenue might be achieved 
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without creating unacceptable economic distortions, or unacceptable 
burdens on societal efficiency. Needless to say, there is no easy answer 
– if there were, it would likely already be in use. 
6.2.4 An unconventional solution: the ‘robot tax’
The idea of a ‘robot tax’ originated with the founder of Microsoft, Bill 
Gates. Gates argued that if human workers’ income is taxed today, 
and then a robot is deployed to do the same work, it seems logical 
to think that we should tax the robot at a similar level to the human. 
Some have gone on to suggest that a robot tax could be used to pay for 
the re-training of human workers who have lost their jobs to robots 
(Merler, 2017).
Most economists are sceptical of this proposal. A European robot 
tax would tend to hinder innovation, thus reducing European compet-
itiveness, and possibly leading to distortions in relative investments in 
capital versus human labour (Merler, 2017).
A more obvious and fundamental objection has not been prom-
inent in the literature to date, namely that there is no evidence that 
robotisation has led to significant unemployment to date, and that 
the level of unemployment that artificial intelligence and related 
technologies are likely to cause in the future is uncertain but probably 
not as great as some fear. Most experts (see for instance Arntz et al, 
2017) have now concluded that the actual level of unemployment to 
be expected as a consequence of digitalisation is nowhere near the 47 
percent Frey and Osborne (2017) predicted (see section 3.4). Some 
empirical analysis, including our own (see sections 2.4 and 3.4), finds 
that unemployment is actually lower today in the regions that have 
seen the greatest deployment of robots and ICT. In other words, the 
robot tax might be a response to a problem that is not real.
6.3 Addressing possibly high unemployment
A much-discussed reform is that of an unconditional basic income 
(UBI) that might partly or fully replace current social protection 
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schemes. While proponents argue that this reform would help to redis-
tribute the benefits from automation and digitalisation, critics stress 
that financing a basic income would require higher taxes and might 
lead to unintended consequences such as the reduction of people’s 
willingness to work (Midoes, 2019).
Much of the recent interest in UBI has been prompted by forecasts 
of widespread unemployment arising from automation, such as those 
made by Frey and Osborne (2017). If the degree to which automation 
and artificial intelligence cause net unemployment is more modest, as 
more recent studies suggest (see sections 2.4 and 3.4), there might be 
little need for UBI.
In January 2017, Finland started an experiment, paying random-
ly-selected long-term unemployment-benefit recipients a guaranteed 
basic income that was not reduced if they found work. The results of 
this trial are not published at the time of writing; however, the Finnish 
government rejected a proposal to expand the experiment to a sample 
of employees (OECD, 2019). Press reports suggest that recipients were 
happier, but that few behavioural changes have been visible39. Our 
understanding, based on informal discussions with highly knowl-
edgeable local stakeholders, is that the funds provided (just €560 per 
month) substituted guaranteed funds for non-guaranteed funds that 
the same recipients would have received anyway with high likelihood. 
Given the rather small funding, and the fact that the funding was not 
incremental for the great majority of recipients, it is not surprising that 
large scale behavioural changes were not in evidence.
6.4 Managing rapid change: Education, training and more
The degree to which digitalisation will cause unemployment might be 
debated, but there is no question that it will lead to disruption in the 
workplace. It will be necessary to manage the rapid and accelerating 
39 Ashitha Nagesh (2019) ‘Finland basic income trial left people “happier but jobless”’, 
BBC News, 8 February.
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changes associated with widespread digitalisation. Some professions 
will disappear, others will emerge, but nearly all are likely to be trans-
formed profoundly. The impact might well be greatest on medium-skill 
workers whose routine jobs are most likely to be eliminated by artifi-
cial intelligence and automation.
A theme throughout this Blueprint has been that the traditional 
model of lifetime full-time employment in a stable and profitable firm 
has been on the decline for many decades. Automation, digitalisation 
and robotisation are hastening a decline that was already underway.
It is already the case that many of us perform work that is quite 
different from that for which our academic training prepared us. We 
strive today to train people for the jobs of today and tomorrow, but it 
is a safe bet that many who are in school today will ultimately do jobs 
very different from those for which they were trained.
The implications are clear, if challenging to respond to. For schools 
and training programmes, it will be necessary to maintain a focus not 
only on the specific narrow skills needed for today’s jobs, but also on 
broader skills such as quantitative skills and foreign language skills, 
which contribute to flexibility in the future, and that can be applied in 
many different ways.
For individuals, expectations must change. Most of us grew up 
expecting to complete our formal education, and then to spend our 
working years contributing to some profession. Those days are gone. 
For those in school today, the more likely sequence will comprise 
alternating periods of training and of work, as they adapt to changing 
needs of the job market. This is the new normal.
A number of EU countries have sought to respond to these new 
realities by creating accounts for training, to be used by those who 
already have established jobs.
With an accelerating pace of change, a key challenge will be to take 
those who are thrown out of gainful employment through no fault of 
their own, and to get them back to work without falling into poverty 
while they make the transition. This is partly a job for social protection 
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funding, and partly a matter of retraining to enable redundant workers 
to rejoin the workforce with no more loss of time, and no more loss of 
self-esteem, than are strictly necessary. Some EU countries do a nota-
bly better job of this today than others.
All of this implies a need for our institutions to evolve in ways that 
encourage career change and flexibility. Europe today is subject to 
many forms of institutional rigidity. In order to adapt, it is this rigidity 
that we will need to overcome.
Education and training are primarily the responsibility of the 
member states rather than of the EU, but here as elsewhere the EU can 
promote good policy and can play a supporting and constructive role.
6.5 European Union measures and member-state measures
Social protection is first and foremost the responsibility of EU member 
states. The explicit authority of the EU in the sphere of social protec-
tion is circumscribed but still substantial. First, the EU has explicit 
authority under the TFEU to promote the single market, notably by 
facilitating the free movement of workers, which is essential to an 
integrated labour market. Second, the EU has somewhat broader 
authority to “take initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States’ 
social policies”. Third, the EU has authority, albeit limited, to establish 
minimum standards for social protection in the member states (Art. 
153 TFEU). The Council Recommendation (European Commission, 
2018) is largely a manifestation of this third source of authority.
The Council Recommendation does not establish a legally binding 
framework, but it has moral force. The Council Recommendation does 
not create obligations in terms of the actions to be taken by member 
states: however, it calls on each of them to develop and submit an 
action plan on how the Council Recommendation will be imple-
mented in the member state. It calls on the Commission (together 
with the Social Protection Committee) to establish a benchmarking 
framework and to develop agreed common quantitative and quali-
tative indicators to monitor implementation. With that in place, the 
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Recommendation says progress is to be monitored “in the context of 
the multilateral surveillance tools in line with the European Semester 
and the Open Method of Coordination for Social Inclusion and Social 
Protection”.
Member-state social protection systems are extremely diverse, and 
will continue to be diverse under the Council Recommendation. A one 
size fits all approach would not work, and would not be accepted by 
the member states or by their citizens. This is not necessarily a defect 
– it is not clear that perfect harmonisation of social protection systems 
within the EU is necessary or even desirable. Current arrangements 
have evolved over many decades in response to the perceived needs of 
each member state.
At the same time, the Council Recommendation is an attempt to 
promote minimum standards of social protection across the member 
states, irrespective of how these standards are achieved.
The Council Recommendation is designed to have effect through 
moral suasion and to some extent through name-and-shame 
mechanisms. These mechanisms have limited force. If the Council 
Recommendation is truly to have impact, it falls to the European 
Commission and EU agencies to monitor implementation and to 
encourage any laggard member states to provide adequate social 
protection.
The tools available to the Commission to monitor and benchmark 
implementation are, as noted, the European Semester and the Open 
Method of Coordination for Social Inclusion and Social Protection. The 
Commission should employ these tools judiciously. The Commission 
can also identify and promote best-practice implementation mecha-
nisms as they emerge.
Will the Council Recommendation be effective? It is hard to say – it 
faces high hurdles, and comes at a time of ebbing solidarity among the 
member states. That the member states were able to achieve consen-
sus at all on basic principles can be viewed as a significant achieve-
ment, but whether that achievement can be translated into concrete 
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change at member-state level remains to be seen.
6.6 Summary of recommendations
A number of recommendations flow from the discussion in this 
chapter:
• The Commission should promote consensus and convergence 
among EU countries on the classification of self-employment, and 
should identify and promote best practices that have been imple-
mented by individual member states.
• Member states should strive to ensure that nominally self-em-
ployed workers whose circumstances are not very different from 
those of employees (ie the dependent self-employed) are not inap-
propriately barred from statutory access to social protection.
• Member states should ensure that there is mandatory statutory 
coverage in the key branches of social protection40, not only for 
traditional employees, but also for non-traditional employees, 
providing benefits (and also incurring costs) proportionate to their 
respective circumstances.
• Where eligibility or benefit levels depend on the number of hours 
worked, member states should ensure that they are properly accu-
mulated across different modes of work, both within the member 
state and also for individuals who move from one member state to 
another.
• Member states might want to consider whether an eventual shift in 
the direction of a universal Beveridgean system (where benefits are 
available to all citizens and long-term residents, and are funded out 
of general revenues) is warranted.
• Member states need to re-think social dialogue to enable certain 
40 Sickness and healthcare benefits, maternity/paternity benefits, old age and inva-
lidity benefits, benefits related to accidents at work and occupational diseases, and 
(except for the self-employed) unemployment benefits.
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of the self-employed to participate in ways appropriate to their 
circumstances. Social dialogue partners such as unions might also 
wish to consider changes to enable them to better accommodate 
the needs of non-traditional workers and the dependent self-em-
ployed.
• Many member states see a complementary role for unions, insur-
ance companies or other organisations in the provision of social 
protection. These arrangements are already showing signs of being 
able to adapt to the changing world of work. This is a positive trend 
that should be encouraged.
• Monitoring the efficiency of workers is normal and appropriate, but 
new norms might be needed to ensure that workplace surveillance 
does not become needlessly or inappropriately intrusive.
• Systems in which workers cover the full costs of their benefits are 
unlikely to be sustainable in the medium term. It will be increasing-
ly difficult to reconcile rising costs with a shrinking funding base. 
It is already the case that no EU member state implements purely 
worker-funded social protection.
• In a Beveridgean system, coverage is universal, and payments come 
from general revenues rather than from funds earmarked for social 
protection. This might help to avoid mismatches and distortions, 
but funding must be adequate. A shift in this direction seems to be 
in order, but no EU country implements a purely universal model 
today, and we do not expect purely universal-coverage social pro-
tection models to emerge in the foreseeable future.
• It seems clear that, in the medium term if not the near term, new 
revenue sources need to be found if the EU social protection model 
is be maintained and expanded.
• Universal basic income (UBI) and the negative income tax might 
prove to be of interest if automation and artificial intelligence result 
in a massive net reduction in employment; for now, however, wide-
spread unemployment does not seem likely.
• Even in the absence of a massive net reduction in employment, 
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changes to the nature and volume of work will be hugely disruptive. 
Rapid and accelerating change because of digitalisation will need 
to be managed in the near to intermediate term. Social protection 
will need to step in to help people get back to work without falling 
into poverty while they make the transition from obsolete jobs to 
newly-created jobs. This is likely to be especially true for medi-
um-skill workers whose jobs are most likely to be eliminated by 
artificial intelligence and automation. A shift from traditional forms 
of education and training to a focus on lifelong learning is urgently 
needed. It will be necessary to overcome the institutional rigidity 
that gets in the way of career change and flexibility.
• The Council Recommendation strikes the right balance and estab-
lishes the right principles, but is a recommendation that does not 
create binding obligations. Whether it can be effective remains to 
be seen. The Commission must monitor and benchmark imple-
mentation by member states to ensure that reasonable standards 
are met. In doing so, the goal of protecting workers should take 
precedence over harmonisation across the member states.
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DIGITALISATION AND EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
Rapid technological progress and innovation can destroy jobs and disrupt 
welfare systems. This is not a new concern. Historically, automation of 
production processes has led to extraordinary efficiency gains and to the 
displacement of labour. But history has also shown that, in the longer run, 
the gains in efficiency pay off and new jobs are created.
But the past is not necessarily a guide to the future. Currently, an 
unprecedented digitalisation of our economy is underway. Artificial 
intelligence has become a reality and machines are able learn how to 
outperform humans in some cognitive tasks. The way work is performed 
is also changing, with jobs allocated via online platforms and people 
matched to tasks in a way that means they are neither full-time 
employees, nor self-employed workers in the traditional sense.
For welfare systems, which are largely funded by taxes on 
employment, these changes have significant implications. One of the 
big challenges of the twenty-first century will be to redefine the nature 
and functioning of welfare states in the context of the fundamental 
changes brought about by digitalisation, artificial intelligence and the 
changing status of workers. If technology has a negative impact on labour 
income, how will the welfare state be funded? How can workers’ welfare 
rights be secured? This volumes tackles these questions and provides 
recommendations to inform the discussion in the European Union.
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